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Mutual Funds and Information Diffusion: 
The Role of Country-Level Governance 
 
Chunmei Lin*, Massimo Massa†, Hong Zhang‡ 
 
Abstract 
 
We hypothesize that poor country-level governance, which makes public information less reliable, 
induces fund managers to increase their use of semi-public information. Utilizing data from 
international mutual funds and stocks over the 2000-2009 period, we find that semi-public 
information-related stock rebalancing can be five times higher in countries with the worst quality of 
governance than in countries with the best. The use of semi-public information increases price 
informativeness but also increases information asymmetry and reduces stock liquidity. It also 
intensifies the price impact and liquidity crunch during the recent global financial crisis.     
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Introduction 
The recent financial crisis has shifted the role of institutions to the forefront of analysis. It has been 
shown that the quality of country-level governance affects corporate governance and, thus, firm value 
(Doidge et al., 2004, 2007, Aggarwal et al., 2009). Less attention has been focused on how country-
level governance affects how investors process information. This economic channel, however, may 
affect information transmission in the financial markets. Let us consider the Kim and Verrecchia (1994) 
intuition that savvy market participants, such as asset managers and analysts, can process information 
better than the market by converting a firm’s noisy public signals (e.g., earnings announcements) into 
more accurate information (semi-public information).
1
 In this context, follow-up trading by such savvy 
market participants has a dual impact on the market: on the one hand, it contributes to price efficiency 
by impounding new information into the stock price; on the other hand, it reduces stock liquidity by 
increasing information asymmetry and therefore discouraging the participation of less capable 
investors (those unable to process information).  
We argue that the quality of country governance affects this information-generating process. 
Public information is typically of lower quality in countries with poor governance: firms' publicly 
released financial reports are less accurate (DeFond et al., 2007), firms are less transparent (Morck et 
al., 2000, Jin and Myers, 2006, Haw et al. 2012, Bartram et al., 2012), and firm behavior may be 
distorted by the threat of expropriation by the State (e.g., Opp, 2012). For example, in Oct 2008, the 
People’s Daily in China—the country with the worst protection of property rights—reported: “Local 
politicians suppressed a company report about tainted milk powder until the completion of the 
Olympic Games to avoid creating a negative influence on society.” In this context, the absence of 
reliable public information incentivizes savvy market participants to generate more semi-public 
information than they do in countries with good governance. Their ensuing trading, consequently, both 
increases the (otherwise low) informativeness of stock prices and reduces stock market liquidity.  
                                                          
1 The notion that some investors are better than others at processing public information has important economic implications, 
as noted by Kandel and Pearson (1995). More recently, Engelberg, Reed and Ringgenberg (2012) show that a significant 
portion of short sellers’ profitability actually comes from their skills in analyzing public information.  
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Thus, our main intuition, which we call the information asymmetry augmentation hypothesis, 
assigns a fundamental role to (poor) country governance in shaping financial markets because its 
(negative) impact on public information cannot be offset without hurting other properties of the market. 
Specifically, the improvement in price informativeness comes at the price of increased information 
asymmetry (among different types of investors) and ensuing reduced stock liquidity.  
We can compare this intuition with an alternative information asymmetry reduction hypothesis 
that focuses on the information asymmetry between the firm and the market—as opposed to that 
between more- and less-savvy market participants from the previous hypothesis. Because the pursuit 
of semi-public information by savvy investors helps reduce such asymmetry, it encourages 
participation and increase liquidity, helping to reduce the negative impact of poor country governance 
with no further negative implications on the stock market.  
We test these hypotheses using data on international mutual fund managers—our proxy for savvy 
investors—and international stocks over the 2000-2009 period. We follow Acemoglu and Johnson 
(2005) and focus on two representative types of country-level governance (henceforth, governance): 
one that supports private contracts, i.e., contracting institutions (horizontal governance), and one that 
constrains governments and expropriation by the elite, i.e., property rights institutions (vertical 
governance). Each type of governance affects the diffusion of information throughout the market. For 
instance, the threat of expropriation is a major motivation for firms to hide information (e.g., Morck et 
al., 2000, Jin and Myers, 2006). Property rights institutions are also known to be linked to firm value 
(Doidge et al., 2004, 2007). Contracting institutions, on the other hand, directly affect the boundary 
and complexity of firms (e.g., Williamson 1975, 1985, Acemoglu et al., 2009), and it is well known 
that public information for more complex firms is less accurate (e.g., Cohen and Lou, 2012).  
Relying on Kim and Verrecchia (1994) and on the accumulated empirical evidence indicating that 
analysts are able to process information, particularly in the global market (e.g., Chang et al., 2001, Jin 
and Myers, 2006, Bae et al., 2008, Xu et al., 2013), we use changes in analyst recommendations as a 
proxy for semi-public information. We further proxy for the use of semi-public information of a fund 
with the sensitivity of its semi-annual changes in stock holdings to the contemporaneous changes in 
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analyst recommendations for a specific stock. We find strong evidence that this sensitivity is affected 
by governance: whereas a one-standard-deviation increase in analyst recommendations typically 
induces funds to increase their stock holdings by 1.03% and 6.23% for stocks in countries with the 
best horizontal and vertical governance, respectively. The effect in countries with the worst 
governance is 17.2% and 17.8%, or five times higher, which suggests that mutual fund managers use 
more semi-public information in countries with poor governance.  
To validate managers’ incentives in pursuing semi-public information, we examine how fund 
managers use semi-public information side-by-side with pure (i.e., unprocessed) public information 
and how this use of information affects fund performance. We use Dow Jones news releases as a 
proxy for pure public information because they typically contain less professional judgments than 
analyst reports. We first verify that there is a negative (positive) correlation between fund managers’ 
use of semi (pure) public information and the quality of country governance. More importantly, 
relying on semi-public information enhances risk-adjusted performance. A one-standard-deviation 
increase in the use of semi-public information induced by poor horizontal (vertical) governance is 
related to a higher annual risk adjusted performance of 38 (39) basis points. By contrast, relying on 
pure public information does not lead to superior performance. This test confirms both the usefulness 
of our empirical proxy of semi-public information and the benefits for funds to pursue semi-public 
information when country governance is poor. 
Building on these findings, we further investigate how governance impacts liquidity and stock 
price informativeness by affecting the use of semi-public information. Empirically, a one-standard-
deviation increase in the use of semi-public information due to poor horizontal (vertical) governance is 
related to an 11% (15%) higher Amihud illiquidity, a 3.4% (2.9%) higher portion of zero daily returns, 
and a 2.5% (2.2%)  higher log of idiosyncratic volatility. Therefore, poor governance-induced usage of 
information increases illiquidity and stock informativeness as per Morck et al. (2000) and Jin and 
Myers (2006), which is consistent with the information asymmetry augmentation hypothesis.  
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One caveat here is that idiosyncratic volatility may not be a clean proxy for informativeness.
2
 To 
further verify the conclusion about stock informativeness, we examine price responses to news and 
find that the use of semi-public information amplifies the stock reaction to news – i.e., stock returns 
experience a greater positive (negative) reaction to good (bad) news. This pattern confirms that price 
informativeness increases with the use of semi-public information. Importantly, we also find that the 
poor-governance induced use of semi-public information is typically related to stocks with lower 
valuations, such as a lower market-to-book ratio or Tobin’s Q, suggesting that the cost of increased 
information asymmetry outweighs the benefit of improved informativeness. 
Information processing also has important implications during crises. The information asymmetry 
augmentation hypothesis posits that when markets with poor governance are exposed to a major 
negative shock—a crisis—semi-public information-related trades will further discourage liquidity 
trading, leading to price drops and liquidity crunches that far exceed those experienced by stocks in 
countries with strong institutions. Through this channel, markets with poorer country governance are 
essentially more vulnerable to crises. By contrast, according to the information asymmetry reduction 
hypothesis, semi-public information-related trades stabilize the market during the crisis. Our tests 
during the 2008-2009 global financial crisis lend strong support to the former hypothesis. The impact 
on liquidity is particularly significant and more substantial than that observed during normal periods: a 
one-standard-deviation increase in the (pre-crisis) fund use of semi-public information induced by 
poor horizontal and vertical governance is associated with a 31% and 27% higher Amihud illiquidity 
for any given stock during the crisis period, respectively.  
Finally, we address potential endogeneity issues and provide a list of robustness checks. Among 
them, we show that the use of alternative governance indices – e.g., disclosure (Bushman et al., 2004), 
the poor governance Index (computed from Karolyi et al., 2012), anti-self-dealing (Djankov et al., 
2008), and accounting transparency (Durnev et al., 2009) – lead to similar results. We also find that 
short-selling constraints enhance the impact of governance-induced usage of information during the 
crisis.  
                                                          
2
 Idiosyncratic risk may be affected by country risk, investor protection, financial developments and openness, disclosure and 
noise trading, and growth opportunities. Bartram et al. (2012) provide a detailed summary and additional references. 
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Overall, our analysis demonstrates how country governance affects the way information is 
processed and incorporated into stock markets. Differential processing of information (e.g., Kim and 
Verrecchia 1994) is known to affect information asymmetry and market conditions following the 
announcement of macro news (Green, 2004) and corporate news (e.g., Lee et al., 1993, Krinsky and 
Lee 1996, Madureira and Underwood 2008, Sarkar and Schwartz 2009). Its impact may even be 
extended to the effectiveness of regulations (Bailey et al., 2003). Our unique contribution is to 
highlight the pivotal role played by fund managers who can generate semi-public information when 
public information is less reliable because of poor governance. However, poor country-level 
governance proposes a fundamental challenge to the financial market even in the presence of informed 
managers: the low-information problem of poor country governance can be solved only by creating 
other problems, such as illiquidity, which may outweigh the positive effects of more information and 
destabilize the market during crises.  
This intuition not only enriches the literature examining the role of country-level governance on 
financial markets (e.g., Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999, Wurgler, 2000, Morck et al., 2000, Jin 
and Myers, 2006, Bartram et al., 2012, Karolyi et al., 2012, Opp 2012) but also has important 
normative implications. Our results suggest that, for countries with poor governance, advances in 
institutions in either property rights or contracting quality are a necessary condition to further improve 
their financial markets. Without a proper progress in institutions, policies focusing solely on the 
development of financial intermediaries such as mutual funds may adversely affect the market. 
Overall, country-level governance seems to shape the market in a more profound way than 
traditionally understood by affecting the creation and transfer of semi-public information. 
Griffin et al. (2011) show that insider trading reduces the price reaction to the release of public 
information. Our results are complementary in that we focus on one type of savvy external investors 
who can process information: mutual funds. Unlike insiders, whose trading injects information into the 
market prior to the release of public news (e.g., Kyle 1985), mutual funds process public information 
during the news release period and, therefore, enhance price informativeness over the period. 
7 
 
We also contribute to several other strands of the literature. We are the first to show how country-
level governance affects asset pricing by impacting mutual funds' learning processes and information 
discovery in the international context. In so doing, we contribute to the literature regarding how 
country-level governance affects mutual funds' global investments (e.g., Chan et al., 2005, Ferreira 
and Matos, 2008) and to the literature on the impact of country-level governance on firms (e.g., 
Doidge et al., 2004, 2007, Aggarwal et al. 2009). In addition, we extend the literature on the use of 
information by mutual funds (e.g., Kacperczyk and Seru, 2007) to the international context. We show 
that the information content of mutual fund trading and its market implications may be different in 
weak governance countries compared with the U.S.  
II. Testable Hypotheses and Empirica
0 
 
l Specifications 
 We now lay out our hypotheses. We provide the main intuition here and report the model in detail in 
Appendix A. The key assumption of both our model and that of Kim and Verrecchia (1994) is that a 
noisy public signal released by a firm (e.g., an earnings announcement) can be better processed by 
certain market participants who are able to use their informed judgment to gain an informational 
advantage over the market. Indeed, experts who follow a firm closely (e.g., financial traders and 
analysts) are capable of making informed judgments about the public signal that allow them to 
improve its precision. We refer to the superior information coming from informed judgments or better 
skills at processing public information as semi-public information to differentiate it from the truly 
private information that corporate insiders may directly observe.  
The incentive to generate semi-public information is stronger when public information is less 
reliable and uncertainty is higher—i.e., when the public information in the market is noisier. We argue 
that this is the case for firms located in countries with poor country-level governance because the risk 
of expropriation makes the cash flows of these firms riskier (e.g., Opp, 2012) and makes it more 
advantageous (if not easier) for these firms to hide information (Morck et al., 2000, Jin and Myers, 
2006, De Fond et al., 2007, Haw et al. 2012, Bartram et al., 2012). In addition, firms invest less in 
corporate governance in countries with poor institutions (Doidge et al., 2007). These effects reduce the 
quality of firm disclosure and make public information less trustable, which effectively incentivizes 
institutional investors to use more semi-public information and less public information in their trading. 
Thus, the incentive to generate semi-public information is stronger when the quality of country-level 
governance is lower.     
In Kim and Verrecchia (1994), the use of semi-public information allows professional investors 
(fund managers) to generate superior performance. This intuition also applies internationally: poor 
governance-induced use of semi-public (public) information leads (does not lead) to better risk-
adjusted performance. The link to performance not only completes the logic of the argument—
superior performance gives funds an incentive to pursue semi-public information—but also helps us 
empirically differentiate and validate the proxies we use for semi-public and public information.  
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The impact of country-level governance on fund managers’ behavior has implications for the 
financial market. In general, trading on semi-public information is not only profitable but also partially 
revealing (e.g., Kyle 1985) because it impounds information into the market, effectively ameliorating 
its informational efficiency. Meanwhile, however, the informational advantage enjoyed by the 
investors trading on semi-public information increases information asymmetry between these investors 
and other less-informed market participants, such as discretionary liquidity traders, which discourages 
the trading of such less-informed traders. In other words, the ability of some traders to process semi-
public information will simultaneously increase stock price informativeness, enhance information 
asymmetry, and reduce liquidity. Poor country-level governance, by reducing the precision of public 
information and enhancing the incentive for fund managers to use semi-public information, 
strengthens these asset-pricing effects, which suggests that poor country-level governance can have an 
incremental impact on the informativeness and illiquidity of the assets in the market by inducing such 
behavior in fund managers. This hypothesis thus posits that the use of semi-public information 
induced by poor country-level governance improves the general informativeness of the stock price but 
reduces stock liquidity.  
These considerations can be summarized as the information asymmetry augmentation hypothesis. 
This hypothesis is articulated in two parts. First, poor country-level governance induces capable fund 
managers to discover and use semi-public information. Second, the use of semi-public information 
induced by poor country-level governance improves the general informativeness of the stock price at 
the cost of lowered levels of liquidity.  
An alternative hypothesis (the information asymmetry reduction hypothesis) posits that the pursuit 
of semi-public information increases stock informativeness and reduces the informational asymmetry 
between the firm and the rest of the market. Reducing this type of information asymmetry should 
increase the market participation of external investors and, therefore, stock liquidity. In this case, the 
activity of savvy investors can ameliorate the bad influence of poor country-level governance at no 
additional cost. Overall, this hypothesis posits that the use of semi-public information induced by poor 
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country-level governance improves the general informativeness of the stock price and improves 
liquidity.  
One corollary for both hypotheses concerns behavior during periods of major market shocks. The 
information asymmetry augmentation hypothesis posits that when markets with poor country-level 
governance are exposed to a major negative shock, such as a crisis, fund managers’ trades will further 
discourage liquidity trading, leading to price drops and liquidity crunches that far exceed those 
experienced by stocks in countries with strong institutions. By contrast, the information asymmetry 
reduction hypothesis posits that when markets with poor governance are exposed to a major negative 
shock, fund managers’ trades will increase liquidity trading, leading to lower price drops and better 
liquidity conditions. In other words, the corollary relates the quality of country-level governance to a 
market’s vulnerability to crises.  
III. Data and Variable Construction  
We now describe the sources of our data and the construction of our main variables. 
A. Data Sample and Sources 
Our sample covers the 2000-2009 period. We focus on open-end equity mutual funds. We obtain the 
data on international mutual funds from Morningstar International, which has complete coverage of 
open-end mutual funds worldwide beginning in the early 1990s. The database is survivorship bias-free 
and includes data on both active and defunct funds. The initial sample included 65,336 equity funds 
and share classes (both active and dead funds). Different share classes are reported for each fund. 
These represent claims to the same portfolio of assets, but with different fees. We consolidate multiple 
fund share classes into portfolios and focus on portfolio-level information.
6
 The ensuing sample 
contains 27,992 equity fund portfolios (both active and dead funds), which we will call funds. 
                                                          
6 The primary fund is typically the class with the highest total net assets (TNA). In general, the primary class represents more 
than 80% of the total assets across all share classes. 
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We match the funds with ownership data from FactSet/LionShares. This database provides 
portfolio holdings for institutional investors worldwide.
7
 We consider all types of stock holdings of 
open-end funds (common shares, ADR, GDR, and dual listings). The reporting frequencies of mutual 
fund holdings are quarterly (34% of the cases), semi-annually (58%), or annually (8%). We choose the 
semi-annual frequency to include the majority of funds. We require that the funds are fully invested in 
equity (the total amount invested in equity should not be lower than 95% of the total net asset value) 
and international (the total amount of foreign equity must be more than 50%). We also exclude funds 
that hold fewer than 10 foreign stocks. This threshold allows us to have a reasonable cross-section to 
estimate the fund-level use of semi-public information in different countries.
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In terms of assets, we start with all the publicly listed companies worldwide for which we have 
accounting and stock market information from Datastream/WorldScope and CRSP/Compustat. For 
each company, we consider only common stocks. This sample is then matched with data on 
institutional investors’ stock holdings from FactSet/LionShares, information from analyst 
recommendations from I/B/E/S, and information on Dow Jones News reports contained in RavenPack 
(discussed below).
9
 We then manually merge Morningstar and FactSet/LionShares and match mutual 
fund holdings with Datastream/WorldScope and CRSP.  
The starting sample from Datastream/WorldScope and CRSP covers 45,343 firms over the period. 
After the match with Factset/Lionshare and MorningStar, the sample is reduced to 23,045 firms over 
the period. We further require that stocks have analyst recommendations from I/B/E/S and country-
level governance information based on Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), which reduces the number of 
stocks to 21,329. We also apply several screening procedures for Datastream data errors in monthly 
                                                          
7 The database contains institutional holdings at the investor stock level in 73 countries, with positions totaling US$18.29 
trillion as of December 2008. FactSet/LionShares compiles institutional ownership from semi-public filings by investors 
(such as 13-F filings in the U.S.), company annual reports, stock exchanges, and regulatory agencies around the world. 
Institutions are defined as professional money managers, including mutual fund companies, pension funds, bank trusts, and 
insurance companies. Overall, institutional ownership represents over 40% of the total world stock market capitalization in 
our sample period. In our analyses, we focus on open-end mutual fund ownership, whereas we control for the general 
institutional ownership in our regressions. 
8 We generate consistent results by imposing a filter of 30% or 80% foreign assets. The results for these different samples are 
in the internet appendix. Although the foreign holdings requirement reduces the entire sample size, it increases the relative 
precision in proxying for the reliance of investors on semi-public information that is induced by country-level governance.     
9 We combine DataStream data with the institutional holdings data from FactSet using SEDOL codes (only for non-U.S. 
firms) and ISIN codes. We use CUSIP to merge institutional holdings data with U.S. security data from CRSP. We then 
match every stock holding in the fund portfolio with the respective analyst recommendation available from I/B/E/S.  
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returns, as suggested by Ince and Porter (2006) and others, and drop penny stocks (stocks priced at 
less than $1/share) and stocks with fewer than 12 months of returns or trading information.   
Our final sample includes 12,300 mutual funds from 44 countries investing in 16,313 stocks in 50 
countries. Most funds are from developed countries. Among these funds, U.S. funds represent 69% of 
the sample in terms of TNA but only 22% of the number of funds. A further discussion of the data will 
be provided when we examine the summary statistics. 
B. Information and Governance Proxies 
We use two proxies for information. To proxy for semi-public information, we use data on analyst 
recommendations. This choice follows Kim and Verrecchia (1994) and is supported by the empirical 
literature that shows that active financial analysts are able to process better information, particularly in 
the global markets (e.g., Chang et al., 2001, Jin and Myers 2006, Bae et al., 2008, Xu et al., 2013). In 
the same spirit, we use media reports as a proxy for pure public information because media reports 
typically involve less in-depth judgments, as we will discuss shortly. The original I/B/E/S database 
assigns 1 for ‘strong buy’ and 5 for ‘strong sell’. To simplify the interpretation of our results, we 
reverse the I/B/E/S ranks by subtracting the raw rating from 6. Thus, an increase in the analyst 
recommendation in our analysis is good news for the stock. To make the data homogenous across 
countries, we standardize the distribution of consensus recommendations with respect to each country 
by removing the country average and scaling the difference by the standard deviation of all 
concurrent recommendations in the country. Our results are robust if we do not scale the recommendations. 
The proxy for public information is the Composite Sentiment Score (CSS), which is developed by 
RavenPack, a leading global news database that collects real time firm news from Dow Jones 
Newswires, regional editions of the Wall Street Journal, and Barron's. It begins in 2000 and covers 
more than 170,000 entities over 100 countries. RavenPack conducts linguistic analyses and assigns 
scores (CSS) to the news to reflect linguistic tone, from 0 (very negative news) to 100 (very positive 
news), with 50 being neutral. The CSS scores cover more than 330 different types of news events, 
including product recalls, earnings announcements, layoffs, M&A activity, etc. We use this 
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information to construct a proxy for public signals: News Sentiment (NS), which is defined as the 
average CSS of all news reports about a firm over the six month period. Similar to the case of analyst 
reports, we standardize each distribution of the News Sentiment index with respect to each country.  
Our main proxies for country-level governance come from Acemoglu and Johnson (2005). 
Contracting institutions (horizontal governance) refer to the rules and regulations governing 
contracting between two parties of similar power, such as those between creditor and debtor. Property 
rights institutions (vertical governance) refer to the rules and regulations protecting market participants 
against the power of the government (or the elite). The three contracting indices include legal 
formalism (the index of formality in legal procedures for collecting on a bounced check), procedural 
complexity (the index of complexity in collecting a commercial debt), and the number of procedures 
(the number of procedures involved in collecting a commercial debt). The three property rights indices 
are constraints on the executive (whether there are regulatory limitations on the executive’s actions 
and authority), average protection against expropriation (protection against the risk of expropriation of 
private foreign investment), and private property protection. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) provide a 
more detailed discussion on the different roles played by the two institutions.
10
 
Given that the original indices have different distributions, we standardize them to be distributed 
between 0 (perfect governance) and 1 (weakest governance). Then, we take the average of the three 
horizontal and vertical governance measures to obtain two representative indices. We report a 
graphical view of these indices in Figure 1 (these governance indices are static in nature). In terms of 
horizontal governance, Australia is regarded as the best and Peru the worst. In terms of vertical 
governance, Luxembourg and the U.S. are among the best, and China and Peru are among the worst. 
We also use a series of alternative measures of governance. These are disclosure (Bushman, Piotroski, 
and Smith 2004), the poor governance index (computed as the inverse of the good government index 
of Karolyi, Lee and van Dijk, 2012), anti-self-dealing (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer 2008), accounting transparency (Durnev, Errunza and Molchanov 2009), and the Corruption 
Perceptions Index (Transparency International).  
                                                          
10
 Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) do not have Germany in their data sample – and neither do we.  
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C. Summary Statistics 
We report summary statistics of the final sample in Table I. Panel A tabulates the summary statistics 
over the 2000-2009 period based on a semi-annual sampling frequency. The first six columns report 
the total number of observations and the whole-sample distribution of our main variables, including 
the mean, standard deviation, minimum, median, and maximum values of these variables. To further 
demonstrate the potential influence of country-level governance, we break down the countries in our 
samples into five governance quintiles and compute the average values of our main variables in each 
governance quintile. We report this quintile distribution in the next ten columns. The summary 
statistics can be further detailed at the country level—to save space, they are provided in the Internet 
Appendix.  
The first part of Panel A tabulates the above distributions for the main stock characteristics that are 
used as dependent variables, including book-to-market ratio (B/M), monthly return (Ret), DGTW-
adjusted return (DGTW), idiosyncratic volatility (Idiosyn Vol), Amihud illiquidity, the proportion of 
zero daily firm returns in a period (Zero Return), and Tobin’s Q. Appendix B provides the definitions 
of all variables. 
If we focus on the overall sample, the statistics for these variables are similar to those reported in 
the literature. For example, in Lau, Ng, and Zhang (2010), the monthly return averages approximately 
1% across stocks in different countries, compared with the mean of 1% in our sample. If we compare 
our statistics with Karolyi and Wu (2012), the largest up-to-date sample, our starting stock sample of 
45,343 firms from Datastream/WorldScope and CRSP is comparable to Karolyi and Wu (2012), with a 
total stock number of 37,399. After matching with FactSet/LionShares and I/B/E/S, our final sample is 
smaller and concentrates on the large firms. The governance-quintile distribution of the variables 
suggests that country-level governance (associated with high quintile ranks) may directly affect 
illiquidity, but less so for idiosyncratic risk and stock price (such as DGTW return and Tobin’s Q). 
The former pattern is not surprising, as country characteristics related to governance, such as market 
size and information quality, may affect liquidity. Due to this observation, our later analysis also 
directly controls for country-fixed effects.  
7 
 
The second part of Panel A tabulates the entire sample and quintile distribution of the variables 
related to public or semi-public information, including the number of analysts following the firm (# 
Analyst), the percentage of firms covered by analysts in a country (%Analyst coverage), the average 
value of analyst recommendations in the sample (Re), news sentiment (NS), analyst recommendation 
changes (ΔRe), and news sentiment changes (ΔNS). The last two variables are our main proxies for 
semi-public and public information. Our Internet Appendix provides more detailed country level 
distribution of these variables. More specifically, we report the time-series average of semiannual 
medians of the information variables in each country, following Karolyi and Wu (2012). 
We can see that analyst coverage is substantial in global markets and is typically approximately 70% 
of the stocks in each country. Although analysts tend to follow larger stocks, the high coverage ratio 
reduces concerns about sample selection. By contrast, the coverage of Dow Jones news media is more 
concentrated, and there is a wide country-level variation in the number of news items reported for each 
stock. Developed countries typically have higher media coverage, whereas firms in countries with 
poor governance are typically much less covered by the Dow Jones news, which is consistent with the 
notion that public information is less available in these countries. Because the use of this variable 
would reduce the number of firms particularly in countries with poor governance, our main empirical 
tests will focus only on semi-public information. However, we will use this proxy of public 
information—and its accompanying smaller sample—to explore and differentiate the economic 
impacts of the two sources of information.  
The third part of Panel A summarizes the pooled distribution of mutual fund turnover in stocks 
(           , referring to the percentage rebalancing of stock   in period t by fund k) and the 
distribution of our main independent variables – the use of semi-public information in countries with 
good governance (SemPub_Good) and the incremental use of semi-public information in countries 
with poor vertical and horizontal governance (SemPub_Poor) by the representative mutual fund 
ownership of a stock. We will explain their construction in the next section. Here, we simply note that 
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both fund turnover and our independent variables have reasonably wide distributions.
11 
Furthermore, 
the quintile distribution illustrates a weak correlation between the use of semi-public information 
increases and poor governance, which lends preliminary support to our main hypothesis. Of course, 
the correlation also suggests that fund investment decisions may be clustered in a given country. 
Together with the previous discussion on country-fixed effects, this possibility motivates us to control 
for country and time-fixed effects. We further follow Petersen (2009) to cluster the errors at the 
country and time level for our stock-level regressions to control for within-cluster dependence 
uncaptured by the time or country dummies. Following the literature, we also use different sets of 
control variables that cater to different dependent variables. We will detail the variable lists and the 
reasons for using them when we explain the regression models. The Internet Appendix provides their 
distributions.  
Finally, we report the correlation matrix of the dependent and independent variables in Panel B 
and that of the main and alternative governance indices in Panel C. Panel B illustrates that the use of 
semi-public information induced by poor country-level governance is generally related to less liquidity, 
more idiosyncratic risk, and lower Tobin’s Q. Meanwhile, Panel C suggests that horizontal and 
vertical governance are highly correlated, which is not surprising because developed (emerging) 
countries tend to be better (worse) along both dimensions. In many countries, however, the relation 
between the two governance dimensions is different. China, for example, has extremely poor property 
rights institutions, whereas its contracting institutions are of average quality.  
IV. The Use of Semi-public Information and Quality of Governance 
In this section, we investigate the link between the use of semi-public information and governance, 
and we establish the profitability of strategies based on it.   
A. Semi-public information and fund behavior 
                                                          
11
 In our sample, fund turnover has a mean of -2.21% and a standard deviation of 73%. Several normality tests (Cramer-von 
Mises and Kolmogorov-Smirnov) reject the null hypothesis that the variable has a normal distribution, implying that some 
structural models, such as the one we will describe in equation (1), are perhaps required to understand the formation of the 
variable. 
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We begin by studying whether mutual funds use semi-public information differently depending on the 
quality of governance of the country whose stock they invest in. Thus, for each fund, we regress the 
percentage rebalancing of fund k in split-adjusted holdings of stock i over the semi-annual period on 
the contemporaneous changes in analyst recommendations       , country-level governance, and the 
interaction between governance and changes in analyst recommendations, in addition to a set of 
control variables. More specifically, we estimate for each fund in a given period: 
                     
            
                                                  
where           refers to the percentage rebalancing of stock   in period t,
12
        is the change in 
the analyst forecast of the stock,      is the regression constant,     
  is the sensitivity to semi-public 
information when country-level governance is perfect,    is the index of the quality of governance of 
the country of stock i (it is static and thus does not have a time lag),     
  is the sensitivity to 
governance, and      captures the mutual funds’ incremental  sensitivity to semi-public information in 
the presence of poor governance. The vector of       stacks potential control variables, including 
country and industry return, and lagged analyst recommendation changes. Because the semi-public 
information contained in the analyst reports becomes public after the full release of these reports, we 
focus on the contemporaneous relationship between fund trading and analyst recommendations. In this 
case, the sensitivity of managers’ trading to contemporaneous analyst recommendations describes the 
degree to which fund managers use semi-public information to trade.  
Table 2 reports the average value of the regression coefficients and the corresponding robust t-
statistics. We see that fund rebalancing correlates positively with the contemporaneous changes in 
analyst recommendations. Even more importantly, the effect is stronger in the case of poor country-
level governance and is economically significant. For example, in columns 2 and 3, a one-standard-
deviation increase in changes in analyst recommendation induces funds to increase their stock 
holdings by 1.03% and 6.23% for stocks in countries with the best horizontal and vertical governance, 
respectively. The corresponding figures in countries with poor governance are much higher. They are 
                                                          
12
 We follow Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) in capping the percentage change in stock turnover at 100% (4.6% of the stock 
turnover is above 100%). We have also verified that different thresholds will not qualitatively change our main results.   
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17.2% and 17.8% for Peru and China, which have the worst overall ratings for horizontal and vertical 
governance, respectively, and 15.6% and 16.8% in the five worst countries (Peru, Argentina, Mexico, 
Philippines, and Spain for horizontal governance and China, Peru, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Romania 
for vertical governance).
13
 All these numbers are highly statistically significant. In addition, these 
results remain largely unchanged if we further control for lagged semi-public information and market 
or industry-wide information.  
We rely on equation (1) to define two fund-level measures that capture the importance of semi-
public information in explaining portfolio turnovers. The first is the partial R
2
 of     
       , which we 
call                     (fund use of semi-public information in countries with good governance). 
It describes the use of semi-public information conditional on strong institutions. The second measure 
is the partial R
2
 of the               term, which we call                     (fund use of semi-
public information in countries with poor governance). It represents the effect of the use of semi-
public information induced by (conditional on) poor country-level governance. These two measures 
summarize how the funds use semi-public information in countries with varying qualities of 
governance. Semi-public information typically explains 3.8% (mean value) of portfolio turnover for 
funds when the governance of a country is good. Poor country-level governance increases fund 
managers’ use of semi-public information by 3.3% with respect to the unconditional value.  
More importantly, to examine how the governance-induced use of semi-public information affects 
asset pricing, we build stock-level measures that aggregate the fund-level use of semi-public 
information for all the funds that invest in the stock. That is, we define                
                               and                                              , 
where                       and                       proxy for the use of semi-public 
information by fund k that has invested in stock i depending on the quality of governance in the 
                                                          
13 An alternative way to test equation (1) is to first compute the fund use of semi-public information without interacting the 
Δ      with governance, i.e., we first run the regression                     
 Δ            . We then regress the R
2 
from the regression on the quality of country governance. The Internet Appendix confirms that our conclusion remains the 
same. The reason we adopt equation (1) as our main specification is that the interaction term separates the specific 
information impact of country governance from the general country-fixed effects, which allows us to take advantage of the 
time variation in analyst recommendations (governance indices are static) and construct time-varying independent variables 
that are suitable for asset pricing tests. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this insight.  
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country, and                     is the fraction of the stock held by fund k out of all the mutual funds. 
The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1.   
B. Semi-public information and profitability. 
We now investigate whether the use of semi-public information is profitable. As we argued, this test is 
important to both complete the testing of our hypotheses and to validate the choice of empirical 
proxies for different types of information. Following Carhart (1997) and Kacperczyk and Seru (2007), 
we first estimate fund performance based on a 36-month rolling window.
14
 We consider alternative 
measures of risk adjustment—the one-factor alpha of Jensen (1968), the three-factor alpha of Fama 
and French (1993), and the four-factor alpha of Carhart (1997) – to measure fund performance. Given 
that the results are similar, we only report those based on the four-factor alpha.  
Then, we regress performance on the use of semi-public information associated with good 
governance and the use of semi-public information induced by poor governance (Fund SemPub_Good 
and Fund SemPub_Poor) and a set of control variables in a panel specification with country and time-
fixed effects. We cluster the errors by country and time. Fund control variables include the expense 
ratio, portfolio turnover, and fund size (defined in terms of total net assets). The analysis is conducted 
semi-annually to be consistent with the sampling frequency of the Fund SemPub_Poor variables.  
The results are reported in the first two columns of Table 3. They  display a strong and significant 
positive relationship between fund performance and Fund SemPub_Poor. More specifically, a one-
standard-deviation increase in Fund SemPub_Poor is related to a 39 bps higher annualized 
performance for vertical governance and a 38 bps higher performance for horizontal governance. 
Consistent with the findings of Kacperczyk and Seru (2007), the use of analyst information in 
countries with good governance (Fund SemPub_Good) is negatively related to performance, 
                                                          
14
 More specifically, we estimate the factor loadings of funds based on the 36-month period prior to t and then compute the 
performance of the fund in month t as the difference between the realized fund return in month t (in excess of the risk-free 
rate) and the realized risk premium in the same month (i.e., the product of the vector of rolling factor loadings times the 
realized factor return in month t). We then average the monthly performance in a semi-annual period as the performance of 
the period. Finally, we annualize the performance of funds in each period. 
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suggesting that the information content of analyst reports is very different in “bad” countries as 
opposed to “good” countries.  
The next two columns include the incremental use of public information induced by poor country-
level governance (Fund Pub_Poor). As discussed above, we do not use pure public information in our 
main tests because the proxy for public information reduces the sample and may induce selection 
problems across countries. After having established the preliminary results based on analysts, however, 
the side-by-side tests provide a nice robustness check to further validate our previous analyses. The 
fund use of public information is estimated by including in equation (1) the public information 
released from news media (   ) and its interaction with country governance. In the interest of brevity, 
we report the results of this augmented first-stage regression in the Internet Appendix. It suffices to 
say that, in the first-stage regression, the partial R
2
 of the interaction term allows us to define the 
incremental impact of poor governance on fund use of pure public information. We denote this 
variable as Fund Pub_Poor. In columns (3) and (4), we report the impact of Fund Pub_Poor on fund 
performance side-by-side with that of Fund SemPub_Poor. We can see that the side-by-side use of 
public and semi-public information does not absorb the explanatory power of the use of semi-public 
information on fund performance and that there is no relation between the use of pure public 
information (Fund Pub_Poor) and performance. These results are consistent with our interpretation of 
semi-public information and validate our choice of the empirical proxy. 
V. Effects on the Stock Market 
In this section, we relate poor governance-induced use of semi-public information (SemPub_Poor) to 
stock characteristics.  
A. Stock Liquidity and Idiosyncratic Volatility 
We begin by investigating the impact of SemPub_Poor on stock liquidity and idiosyncratic volatility . 
We estimate the following:  
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where           is the one-period-ahead stock characteristic – e.g., liquidity or idiosyncratic volatility 
– and the coefficients    and    represent the sensitivity of the stock characteristics (e.g., liquidity) 
with respect to stock-level SemPub_Poor and SemPub_Good. The vector      stacks the control 
variables. For both liquidity and idiosyncratic volatility, we control for the volatility of fund flows 
(Flow_Std), which may provide flow-based motivations for funds to trade, such as fire sales (e.g., 
Coval and Stafford 2007). We also control for standard firm characteristics, such as book-to-market 
ratio (BM), the logarithm of firm size (LogSize), and institutional ownership (IO) and additional 
variables that are known to affect the dependent variable in the literature, which we will describe 
shortly. These variables are defined in Appendix B and are lagged by one period. We estimate a panel 
with time and country-fixed effects and cluster the errors by country and year. 
Table 4 reports the results of the specifications in which illiquidity is used as the dependent 
variable. In columns 1 to 4, illiquidity is proxied by the Amihud (2002) measure, which is computed 
as the logarithm of one plus the absolute return per dollar of trading volume. We further control for 
seasonality in the spirit of Chordia et al., (2005), Hameed et al., (2010) and Karolyi et al., (2012), as 
detailed in Appendix B. Columns 5 to 8 define illiquidity as the proportion of zero daily firm returns 
in a period (Zero Return). Bekaert et al., (2007) demonstrate that this measure better captures the 
impacts of liquidity than traditional measures such as turnover, in emerging markets.
15
 Columns (1), 
(3), (5), and (7) present our main results. As a robustness check, we also control for the firm 
governance index from Aggarwal et al. (2009) in the remaining columns, as well as a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 when the firm governance index is available and zero otherwise in order to 
control for the potential fixed effect of firms that do not have corporate governance data.
16
 Finally, we 
follow Gopalan et al. (2012) and further control for variables that are known to affect firm liquidity, 
such as the level of cash over the total assets of the firm (Cash/TA), capital expenditures (CAPEX), 
returns on assets (ROA), and the buy-and-hold return over the previous 6 months (MOM). 
                                                          
15
 The implication of country-level governance on turnover is ambiguous in our extension of Kim and Verrecchia (1994). As 
discussed in Appendix A, the effect depends on the relative mass of informed as opposed to discretionary liquidity traders. 
Thus, we do not include it as a main dependent variable.  
16 Similar to our country-level governance, we normalize the firm-level governance index with 1 for the weakest governance 
and 0 for the best governance. 
14 
 
We find a strong positive correlation between SemPub_Poor and illiquidity across the different 
specifications and for the alternative measures of governance. A one-standard-deviation increase in 
SemPub_Poor defined in terms of horizontal governance is related to an 11% higher Amihud 
illiquidity and a 3.4% proportion of zero return days. The analogous figures for vertical governance 
are 15% and 2.9%.
 17
 The results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar in the specification in 
which we control for firm-level governance. 
Table 5 reports the results for the specifications in which idiosyncratic volatility is used as the 
dependent variable. Due to its skewness, we transform idiosyncratic volatility by adding 1 and taking 
the log transformation. We follow Bartram et al. (2012) and Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang (2012) to 
compute idiosyncratic volatility using an international version of the Fama-French factor model that is 
based on three domestic factors and three international factors in Columns (1) to (4). As a robustness 
check, we also report in Columns (5) to (8) the results based on idiosyncratic volatility computed 
using a model that contains both industry and market factors following the same paper. Our results do 
not change when we use other factor models, including the CAPM model, the domestic Fama-French 
three-factor model, and the Carhart four factor model.  
Finally, in addition to the common control variables, we follow Bartram et al. (2012) and further 
control for a list of variables that may affect volatility in the global market, including ICRG Political 
risk, the creditor rights index, the anti-director index, stock market turnover, stock market 
capitalization (%GDP), private bond market (%GDP), equity market liberalization, disclosure, 
PPE/TA, ROA, Cash/TA, debt maturity, R&D,  Zero Return, age(log), and leverage. All these 
variables are defined in Appendix B.  
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 The economic magnitude for the regression of       is computed as         , where   and   are the dependent and 
independent variables, respectively,   is the regression coefficient,    is the standard deviation of  , and   is the mean of  . 
For instance, the standard deviation of horizontal SemPub_Poor is 0.022, the regression coefficient in column (1) is 0.336, 
and the average Amihud illiquidity is -0.066. From these numbers, we compute the economic magnitude as 0.022 0.336/|-
0.066|=11.2, which means an 11% increase in illiquidity. Note that we use this interpretation because later on we want to 
understand the impact of semi-public information on the level of crisis – i.e., how SemPub_Poor pushes stock characteristics 
away from their mean values during crisis. Alternatively, we can also use the standard deviation of the dependent variable to 
scale the economic magnitude. In this case a one-standard-deviation increase in SemPub_Poor defined in terms of horizontal 
(vertical) governance is related to a 4% (5%) higher Amihud illiquidity and a 2% (1.6%) proportion of zero return days. 
However, these numbers may under-estimate the impact of semi-public information on the liquidity condition of the market 
as a whole. Hence, we mainly use the former scaling method – but we also report the latter scaling when applicable.  
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The results show a highly significant positive relation between idiosyncratic volatility and 
SemPub_Poor, which holds across the different specifications and for the alternative measures of 
governance. In particular, a one-standard-deviation increase in SemPub_Poor defined in terms of 
horizontal (vertical) governance is related to a 2.5% (2.2%) higher idiosyncratic volatility in column 1 
(3).
18
 As before, the results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar if we control for the firm-
specific level of governance.  
These results support our second hypothesis that the governance-induced use of semi-public 
information translates into higher informativeness of the stock price – idiosyncratic volatility (e.g., 
Morck et al., 2000 and Jin and Myers, 2006) – and simultaneously reduces liquidity when the quality 
of governance is worse. They also confirm the unique role of contracting in the financial service 
industry, as observed by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005). 
B. Stock Reaction and Firm Value 
One potential concern is that, although the proxies of liquidity are relatively clean, idiosyncratic risk 
may not be a powerful proxy for stock price informativeness. Bartram et al. (2012), for instance, report 
that country risk, investor protection, financial development and openness, disclosure and noise 
trading, and growth opportunities can all affect idiosyncratic risk. Thus, in this section, we first 
provide an additional test based on the stock price reaction to verify the impact of SemPub_Poor on 
stock informativeness. We then examine the overall net effect on the stock value of the poor-
governance-induced use of semi-public information.  
The additional test investigates the impact of SemPub_Poor on the stock reaction to semi-public 
information releases. The standard informed trading model (e.g., Kyle 1985) suggests that informed 
trading allows the market to incorporate information at a higher speed. If so, we would expect 
SemPub_Poor to enhance the stock reaction to the release of semi-publicinformation, making it more 
positive in the case of good news and more negative in the case of bad news. To test this conjecture, 
we use both the raw returns and the DGTW-adjusted abnormal return as our dependent variables. The 
                                                          
18 The impacts are 5% and 4% when scaled by the standard deviation of the dependent variable.  
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DGTW adjustment follows Daniel et al., (1997) and uses the benchmark return constructed from the 
portfolios that are matched with the stocks held in the evaluated portfolio based on the size, book-to-
market and prior-period return characteristics of such stocks. We decompose the sensitivity of returns 
to information into reactions to positive and negative information and estimate the following 
semiannual panel regression with country and time-fixed effects, and errors clustered at the country 
and time level: 
                                                                                 
                                                                      
where          is the price reaction of stock i, proxied by either the raw return and or the DGTW 
return,       and      are dummy variables that refer to positive and negative changes in 
standardized analyst recommendations,                 and                 are the use of semi-
public information induced by poor governance or good governance, respectively, and the vector of 
     stacks a list of control variables as in Table 4, except that we further control for momentum. The 
parameters of     and     describe the incremental stock reaction to news induced by SemPub_Poor, 
in addition to what SemPub_Good generates. 
The results are reported in Panel A of Table 6, with columns (1) to (4) for raw return and (5) to (8) 
for DGTW-adjusted returns. These results are consistent across all the specifications and show that 
poor-governance-induced use of semi-public information (SemPub_Poor) indeed amplifies the stock 
reaction to both good news and bad news. This effect is also economically significant. For horizontal 
governance-induced SemPub_Poor, a one-standard-deviation increase is related to a 4.0% (3.6%) 
additional positive return (DGTW return) for good news and a -2.9% (-2.8%) negative return for bad 
news. For vertical governance, the analogous figures are 2.3% (2.6%) and -2.6% (-3.2%).  
As an additional robustness check, we also implement a portfolio-based analysis. The results, 
which we report in our Internet Appendix, are qualitatively and quantitatively similar. These results 
confirm our working hypothesis that the use of semi-public information by the mutual funds amplifies 
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the impact of the news on the stocks, consistent with our previous results that the former improves the 
informativeness of stocks.
19
  
The information discovery role played by the funds is both beneficial – in terms of improving the 
informativeness of the stock price – and costly – in terms of reducing liquidity. It is therefore 
important to detect the overall impact of SemPub_Poor by examining its impact on stock value. We 
follow Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) and alternatively regress market-to-book and Tobin’s Q on 
SemPub_Poor and a set of control variables that could affect the dependent variable, including, among 
others, R&D (research and development expenditure as percentage of total sales) and firm profitability, 
proxied by the concurrent and next two periods’ return on equity (ROE, FROE, F2ROE).  
We report the market-to-book results in columns (1) to (4) and the Tobin’s Q results in columns (5) 
to (8) in Panel B. The results provide evidence of a negative relationship between SemPub_Poor and 
stock value in general. For instance, the impact of SemPub_Poor on market-to-book is significantly 
negative for both vertical and horizontal governance. A one-standard-deviation increase in 
SemPub_Poor is related to a 1.5% lower market-to-book and 1.2% Tobin’s Q for vertical governance 
and impacts of similar magnitude for horizontal governance.  
 Taken jointly, these results suggest that, again, mutual funds play a special role in promoting 
information in economies with poor governance. However, the cost more than offsets the positive 
effects of better information. Thus, the role of mutual funds with respect to processing semi-public 
information in countries with poor governance reduces firm value.  
VI. Extensions  
We now consider extensions to further enrich our economic insight. First, we examine whether the 
cost of poor-governance-induced semi-public information is particularly relevant during the financial 
crisis. Second, we investigate potential endogeneity issues. Finally, we conduct a series of robustness 
checks and discuss, among other topics, the role of public information, short-selling constraints and 
alternative proxies of governance. 
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 Although in the interest of space we only tabulate the panel regressions with country- and year-fixed effects and clustering 
at the country and year level, our main conclusions in the second stage are also robust to Fama-Macbeth regressions. 
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A. The Use of Semi-public Information and the Financial Crisis  
To understand the cost of poor-governance-induced semi-public information during the financial crisis, 
we examine how the pre-crisis level of SemPub_Poor and SemPub_Good affected the changes in 
stock prices and liquidity around the crisis, from the pre-crisis period (2005-2007) to the crisis period 
(2008-2009). We first estimate the following cross-sectional regression with a country-fixed effect for 
illiquidity:  
                                                                                         
where         is the change in illiquidity from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period for stock  , and 
the other variables are defined as before. All the control variables are computed as the mean of their 
pre-crisis period values. Because this is a pure cross-sectional regression, we no longer have the time 
dimension to control for time-related effects. 
We report the results in Table 7, which shows a strong positive relationship between pre-crisis 
SemPub_Poor and increases in illiquidity during the crisis. More specifically, within the context of 
weak horizontal governance, a one-standard-deviation higher SemPub_Poor leads to a 31%  increase 
in Amihud illiquidity during the crisis period. The analogous figures for the case of weak vertical 
governance are 27%.
20
 We see that the impact on illiquidity is much more substantial than we 
observed for normal periods. These findings not only confirm the previous results but also suggest that 
the cost of having some (more capable) investors to process semi-public information is high when the 
market requires liquidity.  
Next, we focus on stock returns. During the crisis, the semi-public information is mostly negative 
because most of the news about the firms is bad. We would therefore expect to see a steeper price drop 
in the presence of SemPub_Poor. Table 8 tests this conjecture. The dependent variable is the change in 
the value of stock i, as proxied by the average monthly DGTW return of stock i during the 2008-2009 
crisis period and the increment of market-to-book ratios from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period. 
We also consider raw returns and Tobin’s Q, but because the results are similar and in the interest of 
                                                          
20 The two numbers translate into 10% and 8% of the standard deviation of illiquidity. These two numbers, however, may 
understand the market-wide impact of  SemPub_Poor during crisis as mentioned. 
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brevity we only report and discuss those based on DGTW returns and market-to-book. We find a 
negative relationship, which is consistent with our previous panel regression results. Indeed, a one-
standard-deviation higher SemPub_Poor is related to a 5.3% lower DGTW-adjusted return and a 5.8% 
lower market-to-book ratio during the crisis period in the case of horizontal governance and a 3.9% 
lower return and 4.4% lower market-to-book ratio in the case of vertical governance. These numbers 
are highly significant both statistically and economically, and they demonstrate the level of impact that 
the quality of country-level governance can have on the market during a crisis period.  
B. Endogeneity Issues 
One potential concern is that the choice of assets in the fund portfolios might be endogenous with 
respect to the governance regime: mutual funds may simply invest more in assets that exhibit high 
SemPub_Poor in countries with poor governance, rather than processing more semi-public 
information for these stocks. In other words, SemPub_Poor may proxy for some unobserved 
characteristic of the assets that is used by investors to select assets without any superior 
information. For example, it may be that the assets that react more to information are more 
appreciated in poor governance countries because they impound information more quickly and are 
therefore less subject to governance issues.  
We provide two pieces of evidence to verify that SemPub_Poor is related to the processing of 
new semi-public information rather than to the selection of stocks with certain characteristics. The 
first evidence, as we have observed above, is that the fund-level use of semi-public information is 
related to superior performance, which is not the case for public information. The link to 
performance implies that funds trading high SemPub_Poor stocks are informed about these stocks, 
which would only (if anything) discourage uninformed funds from investing in such stocks.  
Second, in the case of reverse causality, we would expect that in the presence of an 
improvement in governance: 1) the demand for high SemPub_Poor assets would decline as the 
preference of the funds for these stocks drops; and 2) SemPub_Poor would not change. By contrast, 
if the causality is as we have argued, we would expect the following: 1) the demand for high 
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SemPub_Poor assets would not change; and 2) stock-level SemPub_Poor would decrease as funds 
began to process less semi-public information. In other words, in the presence of reverse causality, 
we would expect a change in ownership on high SemPub_Poor stocks, whereas, according to our 
hypothesis, we would expect a change in SemPub_Poor for all the stocks. Therefore, the two 
alternatives can be tested based on the following two regressions: 
 
                                                                                        
                        
   
 
                                                                                                  
  
 
where         is the percentage change in the holdings of stock   in the aggregate mutual fund holding 
portfolio in country   (where the stock is traded) over the period of t,                   is the 
change in value of SemPub_Poor of the stock over period t conditioned on the fund ownership 
information observed at t-1 (recall that we require fund ownerships to compute stock SemPub_Poor), 
and         is the change in country-level governance, which is proxied by the annual change in the 
Corruption Perceptions Index of the country. The Corruption Perceptions Index ranges from 0 (very 
clean) to 10 (highly corrupt). Here, we use this index because its annual changes are available to most 
countries. Accordingly, in order to align with the data frequency of this index, the regressions are 
conducted annually. 
The reverse causality hypothesis predicts    to be positive in (5A) because the demand for high 
SemPub_Poor stocks increases (decreases) more when governance deteriorates (improves). By 
contrast, our hypothesis predicts   
  in (5B) to be positive because more (less) corruption increases 
(reduces) the use of semi-public information. The results are reported in Table 9. The first two 
columns tabulate the regression of (5A). The coefficient of    is negative or positive but insignificant, 
which rejects reverse causality. The next two columns tabulate the regression of (5B), in which   
′
 is 
consistent with our hypothesis. These results provide a second piece of evidence in favor of the 
causality predicted by our story. Combined, our tests confirm that SemPub_Poor involves an active 
role for mutual funds in processing information, which fits our intuition that mutual funds play a 
pivotal role in transferring the indirect impact of country-level governance to the stock market.  
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C. Robustness checks  
We now consider a set of robustness checks. In the interest of space, we tabulate the detailed 
regression results in the Internet Appendix and only discuss the general methodology and results here.  
We first investigate how poor governance induces funds to use semi-public information side by 
side with pure public information by re-estimating equation (1) and including    , the proxy for 
unprocessed public information, and its interaction with country governance. The results are reported 
in Table A1 in the Internet Appendix. The most important observation is that, unlike the case of 
analyst recommendations, the interaction between pure public information and governance has a 
negative impact on stock turnover. The negative sign is consistent with the idea that poor governance 
makes funds use less pure public information and more semi-public information. 
Next, we examine how country-level constraints on short-selling may affect the pricing impact of 
SemPub_Poor. We know that in the presence of differences in opinions among investors, constraints 
on short-selling may lead to stock price crashes (e.g., Hong and Stein, 2003). Hence, we want to verify 
that the empirical power of SemPub_Poor (particularly during the crisis period) does not come from 
this alternative mechanism. We use as a proxy for short-selling a dummy variable (NoShort) that takes 
the value of 1 if a stock is in countries in which short sales are not allowed, or in countries/ industries 
that experienced short sale bans during the crisis period, and zero otherwise. The list of short-selling 
bans is derived from Beber and Pagano (2013). We also include the interactions between the dummy 
variable and SemPub_Poor and SemPub_Good. 
Two main results emerge from Table A2 in the Internet Appendix. First, controlling for short-sale 
constraints does not absorb the impact of SemPub_Poor on crisis period variables, including the crisis 
period DGTW return and Amihud illiquidity. Second, the interaction between short-sale constraints 
and SemPub_Poor has insignificant impacts. These observations confirm that (weak) governance 
contributed to the recent global financial crisis in a manner that is different from that of diverging 
opinions and short-sale constraints.   
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In the third robustness check, we experiment with alternative measures of country-level 
governance. We consider the poor government index (the reverse of the good government index) from 
Karolyi, Lee, and Van Dijk (2012), the index of disclosure (Disclose) from Bushman, Piotroski, and 
Smith (2004), the anti-self-dealing index (Anti_SD) from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2008), and the accounting transparency measure (Acc Transparency) from Durnev, Errunza, 
and Molchanov (2009). Similar to our main governance variables, we scale the alternative indices to 
be between 0 (good) and 1 (poor). We expect these alternative governance indices to have a significant 
impact on stock market characteristics because they are also capable of identifying weak institutions 
that may reinforce the benefit of semi-public signals (relative to public signals) and induce capable 
traders to use more semi-public information.  
Table A3 in the Internet Appendix shows that weak governance using these alternative governance 
proxies is related to fund managers’ use of semi-public information. We also observe that 
SemPub_Poor increases illiquidity and price informativeness (the reaction of stock return to semi-
public information). The parameters and economic significance are comparable to the SemPub_Poor 
based on our main proxies of governance. (Unreported) tests on the crisis period confirm that the 
SemPub_Poor of these alternative governance measures have a similar crisis period impact to that of 
our main governance variables. Thus, our results are robust to these alternative governance measures.   
The alternative measures are not necessarily orthogonal to our main governance variables. The 
reason we do not mostly focus on them is that, unlike our main proxies, these alternative variables lack 
the flexibility to systematically attribute stock market characteristics not only to the vertical 
relationships between commoners and the elite (i.e., property rights institutions) but also to the 
horizontal relationships between market participants (i.e., contracting governance). However, the 
notion that weak governance induces funds to process semi-annual information, which further affects 
asset prices, is fully supported by all the indices.  
In addition to these main robustness checks, we also show that our main conclusions are robust if 
we use all six individual governance indices of Acemoglu and Johnson (2005)—recall that in our main 
tests, the six indices are aggregated into two representative contracting and property rights indices—
23 
 
and/or their log values, when we use the log-transformation of SemPub_Poor, or when we restrict the 
sample to the top 20 countries. These tests confirm that our results are not driven by a few outliers, 
such as extreme governance values or extreme SemPub_Poor estimations.  
Furthermore, two alternative methods of estimating equations (1) and (3) yield similar 
conclusions. As we mentioned in footnote 10, an alternative way to test equation (1) is to first compute 
the fund use of semi-public information without interacting semi-public information with governance, 
and then to regress     R2 from the regression on the quality of country governance. The results in 
Table A5 confirm that poor country governance induces funds to use more semi-public information. 
Our main specification in equation (1), on the other hand, allows us to take advantage of the time 
variation in analyst recommendations (governance indices are static) and construct time-varying 
independent variables that are suitable for asset pricing tests. Finally, our results are robust to the 
frequency of the estimations (to estimate Fund SemPub_Poor on a quarterly basis when feasible—our 
results are based on a semi-annual estimation frequency to involve more funds) and various cutoff 
thresholds on foreign equity holdings (30% and 80%, in addition to the 50% thresholds in our main 
tests). We tabulate these results and detail our discussions in the Internet Appendix. All these 
additional tests confirm that our results are economically and statistically robust. 
Overall, these results offer a coherent perspective. They show that mutual funds partially offset the 
negative impact of poor country governance on the quality of public information – but such an 
improvement is achieved at the cost of increased information asymmetry and, thus, illiquidity. 
Country-level governance, therefore, plays a fundamental role in shaping financial markets: 
sophisticated market participants cannot compensate for the negative impact of poor governance 
without negatively affecting some market conditions. 
Conclusion 
We study how country-level governance affects the availability and transmission of information in the 
market. Poor country-level governance reduces the usefulness of public information in the market, 
which induces some investors (e.g., fund managers) to use their professional judgment to process 
public information into valuable semi-public information. Trading by these professional investors 
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impounds new information into the market, effectively ameliorating its informational efficiency. 
However, the process of discovering and trading on semi-public information by some traders also 
increases the information asymmetry and reduces market liquidity. Thus, improvements in price 
informativeness come at the cost of illiquidity, a cost that can be particularly high during a crisis 
period in which the extra price drops and liquidity crunches may enlarge the negative impacts of the 
financial crisis. 
We test this hypothesis using data on international mutual funds and international stocks over the 
period 2000-2009. Using changes in analyst recommendations as proxies for semi-public information, 
we confirm that weak country-level governance induces fund managers to use more of this type of 
information. When we use the Dow Jones News releases as a proxy for pure public information and 
investigate its impact side-by-side with that of semi-public information, we find that poor country-
level governance makes fund managers use less public information and that the inclusion of public 
information does not affect the pursuit of semi-public information. More importantly, the use of semi-
public information allows funds to generate risk-adjusted performance, whereas the use of public 
information does not. This finding confirms the usefulness of the empirical proxy of semi-public 
signals and the economic motivation for funds to process such signals. 
Next, to detect the asset pricing impact of such behavior, we aggregate the use of semi-public 
information at the stock level across all mutual fund ownership and compute a stock-level variable, 
SemPub_Poor, which describes the extent to which the institutional investors of a stock with poor 
country governance tend to use more semi-public information than the institutional investors in a stock 
with good country-level governance. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that the poor-
governance-induced use of semi-public information (SemPub_Poor) significantly increases the 
informativeness of a stock as proxied by idiosyncratic volatility as well as the sensitivity of the stock 
price to information, and it reduces liquidity. The net effect is discounted stock value. We also find 
that these effects contributed to the impact of the recent global financial crisis and are robust to 
alternative proxies of governance and endogeneity tests.  
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Our findings provide a novel way of looking at the effects of country-level governance on 
financial markets through the intermediation of mutual funds, which has important normative 
implications. The task of offsetting the negative impact of country-level governance is costly, 
implying that country-level governance may have a greater impact than can be directly measured. 
Indeed, our results suggest that advances in institutions may be a necessary condition to improve the 
overall conditions of the financial markets. 
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Appendix A: Summary of the Model 
This appendix extends Kim and Verrecchia (1994, hereafter, KV) based on a simple additional 
assumption that, in economies with weaker country-level governance, what the market knows about a 
firm (, public news) could be further away from the reality. KV assumes that a firm generates cash 
flows in each of the T periods of an economy. These cash flows are accumulated to the end and 
generate a liquidating value of      
 
   , where    is the cash flow generated by the firm in period 
  – it is known to the public by the end of the period. Now consider one specific period,  , before 
which the firm announces a public signal about the value of    as         , where    is a noise. 
Assume that           and           are the unconditional distributions of the two variables.  
Next, the announcement can be processed with different levels of precision by different types of 
investors. One type of investor, e.g., professional managers, can choose to pay a cost   to obtain a 
second signal (e.g., judgments) to fine tune the firm's public signal. There are  such investors (the 
number is determined endogenously), and the     investor observes (at a cost  ):           , where 
           is a noise. The additional signal is referred to as semi-public information in this paper to 
differentiate it from both the public signal and real insider information (KV refers to it as the private 
signal). These investors also have incentives to trade in period t (and only in this period).  
The KV model further assumes that there are two types of liquidity traders. There are L 
nondiscretionary liquidity traders who trade in each period. There are also TM discretionary liquidity 
traders who can decide when to trade (but they do not observe information). In each period, the three 
types of investors submit trading demands, which allows a risk neutral market maker to update the 
market price. The summation of orders for period   can be denoted as          , where 
     
 
    is the summation of orders from the N informed investors (   is the individual order), and 
   and    are similar summations of orders from nondiscretionary and discretionary investors, 
respectively.  
Based on these assumptions, the informed investors trade following the Kyle (1985) model, which 
leads to an equilibrium for period t that can be characterized as follows: 
                                                                 
where   
 
   
    
               
                                 
    
   
                
         
      
           
 are 
constants, and   is the variance of the nondiscretionary liquidity traders. Note that informed traders 
only participate in this period of trading when they have semi-public information. Discretionary 
liquidity traders will not participate in this period because they will lose money by trading against the 
informed investors in the market. They will participate in trading in other periods. Hence, liquidity 
decreases in this particular period when informed investors can process information. Furthermore, 
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volatility and the level of informativeness of the stock will increase because informed trading moves 
the price. Trading volume may increase or decrease (compared with other periods), depending on the 
mass of the discretionary and informed traders. Finally, the optimal number of informed traders is 
determined by information costs and the benefit of informed trading. 
What could be the impact of country-level weak governance? Intuitively, it implies a gap between 
what firms in the economy claim about their cash flows and what the reality might be. The gap can be 
captured by the conditional variance of the cash flow value based on the public announcement. That is, 
if we denote             ) and       as the conditional variance and precision based on the 
public announcement of the firms, and if we further denote   as country-level governance with a 
higher value corresponding to a weak governance, then we can summarize the impact of weak 
governance as 
  
  
   or 
  
  
  . It is easy to verify that          ). That is, a larger gap 
between the announcement and reality might come from two economic sources related to country-
level governance. First, cash flows are more risky in countries with weaker governance (, 
  
  
  ) 
because the weaker governance might imply some additional exploitation risk to affect the normal 
cash flows that can be generated by the normal business of firms (e.g., Opp, 2012). Second, firms in 
bad countries may make poor announcements (, 
  
  
  ) because managers may find it optimal and 
easy to hide information in such an environment (Morck, Yeung and Yu, 2000, Jin and Myers, 2006, 
DeFond, Hung, and Trezevant, 2007, Haw et al. 2012, Bartram, Brown, and Stulz, 2012). In both cases, 
public information in poor governance countries becomes less accurate than in countries with good 
governance. Because firms invest less in firm-level governance in countries with poor country-level 
governance (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2007) , these problems are unlikely to be solved by corporate 
governance.   
The impact of country-level governance can be summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1: In the presence of weak country-level governance, the equilibrium described above 
will further demonstrate the following properties related to governance: 
1) Informed investors use more of their semi-public signal and less public information in countries 
with bad governance. Mathematically, 
  
     
 decreases in  (or 
  
     
 increases in  ). Furthermore, 
trading variation also relies more on the semi-public signal than on public information in countries 
with weak governance,  i.e., 
          
         
 increases in  . 
2) More informed investors will optimally emerge to exploit private information (, 
  
  
  ) in 
countries with weak governance. 
3) The stock becomes less liquid in countries with weak governance, 
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4) The stock price becomes more volatile and more informative in countries with weak governance. 
Proof: 1): Plugging parameter values, we obtain 
  
     
 
  
         
 
 
      
. Thus, 
 
  
 
  
     
  
  
  
     
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
     
 
  
 
  
  
  . It is trivial to obtain the positive sign for 
 
  
 
  
     
 . Meanwhile, 
          
        
 
            
        
 
          
  
                . It is easy to see that    increases in weak 
governance. To the extent that             is indeterminate because weak governance may or may not 
allow managers to collect more precise private information, the overall ratio increases in weak 
governance. 
2, 3, and 4): KV proves that less precise public information (, a larger  ) allows more informed 
traders to optimally process private information (Lemma 1), less precise public information reduces 
liquidity (proposition 1), and less precise public information enhances volatility and informativeness 
(Propositions 3 and 4). The chain law leads to our results. For instance, because 
  
  
  , we have 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
  . Similarly, 
  
  
   and 
  
  
  , where   is the volatility of the price change and   
denotes the reduction in the variance of    once the stock price is updated by informed trading. Both 
are positive because informed trading affects the stock price in A1 by incorporating more accurate 
information about the cash flow. Our economic intuition is that less precise public information 
induced by weak governance makes it more profitable for managers to process semi-public 
information. Therefore, these markets should exhibit more informed trading, thus reducing liquidity 
and enhancing volatility and price informativeness. 
Note that trading volume becomes indeterminate in our model. This is because there are no 
economic reasons to believe that weak governance will change the mass of discretionary liquidity 
traders relative to that of potentially informed traders, which is a key determinant in trading volume.  
Overall, our extension posits a unique role for financial intermediaries to affect asset pricing 
induced by weak country-level governance: the lack of accurate public information provides 
incentives for them to process their own semi-public information. Their trading, consequently, 
increases the informativeness of the price while reducing liquidity. 
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Appendix B: Variable Definitions 
Horizontal and Vertical Governance Variables 
(We normalize the value of all governance variables with 1 for the weakest governance and 0 for the best governance.) 
Legal Formalism: Index of formality in legal procedures for collecting on a bounced check; ranges from 1 to 7.  
Procedural Complexity: Index of complexity in collecting a commercial debt, valued at 50% of annual GDP per capita; 
ranges from 0 to 10.  
Number of Procedures: Number of procedures involved in collecting a commercial debt, valued at 50% of annual GDP 
per capita.  
Executive Constraints: A seven-category scale, from 1 to 7, with a higher score indicating more constraint.  
Protection Expropriation: Risk of expropriation of private foreign investment, from 0 to 10, with a higher score meaning 
less risk.  
Private Property: From 1 to 5, with a higher score indicating better protection for private property.  
Horizontal Gov: average of normalized Legal Formalism, Procedural Complexity and Number of Procedures. 
Vertical Gov: average of normalized Executive Constraints, Protection Expropriation and Private Property. 
Alternative Governance Variables 
(We normalize the value of all governance variables with one for the weakest governance and 0 for the best governance.) 
Poor Gov: The reverse of the good government index from Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2012). The good government 
index is defined as the sum of the following three indices from the International Country Risk Guide (each ranging from 
zero to ten): (i) government corruption, (ii) the risk of expropriation of private property by the government, and (iii) the 
risk of the government repudiating contracts. Lower scores for each index indicate less respect for private property. 
Disclosure: Assessment of the prevalence of disclosures concerning research and development (R&D) expenses, capital 
expenditures, product and geographic segment data, subsidiary information, and accounting methods based on the 1995 
International Accounting and Auditing Trends from the Center for Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). The source 
is Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004). 
Anti_SD: The anti-self-dealing index of Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008).  
Acc Transparency: Accounting transparency from Durnev, Errunza and Molchanov (2009). 
CPI: Corruption Perceptions Index published by Transparency International. The CPI defines corruption as the misuse of 
public power for private benefit. Every year, it ranks countries on a scale from 10 (very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). ). We 
reverse and scale the index so that CPI ranges from 0 (very clean) to 1 (highly corrupt). 
Measures on the Use of Semi-public and Public Information 
Fund SemPub_Poor: Partial R-square of the               term from regression of Equation (1).  
Fund SemPub_Good: Partial R-square of            term from regression of Equation (1).  
Fund Pub_Poor: Partial R-square of the     
           term.    
Fund Pub_Good: Partial R-square of the     
        term.   
SemPub_Poor: Value-weighted average of Fund SemPub_Poor of funds investing in the stock, weighted by their 
investment values. 
SemPub_Good: Value-weighted average of Fund SemPub_Good of funds investing in the stock, weighted by their 
investment values. 
Pub_Poor: Value-weighted average of Fund Pub_Poor of funds investing in the stock, weighted by their investment 
values. 
Pub_Good: Value-weighted average of Fund Pub_Good of funds investing in the stock, weighted by their investment 
values. 
Mutual Fund Characteristics 
ExpenseRatio: Expense Ratio of mutual funds. 
Turnover: Funds’ turnover. 
FundSize: The natural log of 1 plus the fund’s last period`s total net asset.   
Stock Characteristics 
Amihud Illiquidity(Illiq): We first define a monthly Amihud illiquidity measure for each stock as              
   
  
 , 
where   is the daily return,   is the daily dollar trading volume, and   is the number of trading days in month t. Following 
the spirit of Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam (2005), Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan (2010), and Karolyi, Lee and 
van Dijk (2012), we further adjust for seasonality by running regressions for each stock i based on observations on month 
t:               
  
        , where    is the dummy variable that takes the value of one for calendar months from 
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Feb to Dec m and zero otherwise. We use the residuals      from the regression to obtain monthly measures of Amihud 
illiquidity. Note that these papers typically also control for day-of-the-week and holiday effects for daily liquidity. Since 
these daily controls are less relevant to our semi-annual variables, we focus on calendar month adjustments. We then 
compute semi-annual Amihud illiquidity as the average value of monthly illiquidity within the semi-annual period.  
Zero Return: Percentage of zero return days for a stock during the semi-annual (six-month) period.   
Idiosyncratic Volatility(Idiosyncratic Vol): We define idiosyncratic volatility as the standard deviation of the residuals 
from the daily Fama-French regression in a given semi-annual period. We then transform idiosyncratic volatility by 
adding 1 and taking the log transformation. We follow Bartram et al. (2012) and Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang (2012) use 
two versions of models. In the first version, we use three domestic Fama-French factors and three international factors. In 
the second version, we use the market and industry factors. 
Raw Return: average monthly stock return during the semi-annual period.  
DGTW Return: Following Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), we create 125 style benchmarks based on the 
size, book-to-market, and prior-period return characteristics of all the stocks within each country. We then compute the 
monthly DGTW-adjusted return for each stock as the stock return minus the return of the matching style benchmark in 
the same month. When applicable, we compute the semi-annual DGTW return as the average monthly DGTW return of 
the stock in the semi-annual period.   
Market to Book (M/B): Market Value of Equity/ Book EquityTobin’s Q: ((Total Assets-Book Equity)+Market Value of 
Equity)/Total Assets.   
BM: Book Equity/Market Value of Equity. 
IO: Institutional ownership. 
Logsize: Log of stock market value.   
MOM: Cumulative returns from the previous 6 months.  
ROE: Return on equity, the ratio of earnings during year t over the book value of equity at the end of year t. 
FROE, F2ROE: The next two (semi-annual) period’s ROEs. 
Flow_Std: The standard deviation of stock-level fund flow in the six-month period. Stock-level fund flow is defined as 
fund flows weighted by the fraction of outstanding shares invested by funds.  
Changes in Analyst Recommendation (∆Re): We reverse the rating (let rating = 6 – raw rating) such that a positive ∆Re 
means an upgrade in analyst recommendation. 
Leverage: Total debt divided by equity 
Cash/TA: Ratio of cash and cash equivalents to lagged total assets.  CapEx: Capital expenditures, defined as the ratio of 
a firm's capital expenditures to lagged total assets. When the data are missing, this variable is set to zero. 
R&D: Research and development expenditure as a percentage of total sales. 
ROA: Ratio of earnings before depreciation, interest, and taxes over lagged value of total assets. 
Firm Gov: The firm governance index from Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira and Matos, 2011, which is the percentage of the 41 
governance attributes that a firm meets. We normalize the value with one for the weakest governance and 0 for the best 
governance). 
 PPE/TA: Total property, plant, and equipment (net) divided by total assets 
 Age(log): Difference between year of observation and year of first listing + 1. 
Debt maturity: Total long-term debt (due in more than 1 year) divided by total debt. 
 
Other Country Level control Valuables 
ICRG political risk index: Index measures the overall stability and quality of government institutions using 10 different 
qualitative measures such as internal and external conflict, corruption, law and order, and bureaucratic quality. Higher 
values represent more stable and higher quality government institutions. Data are from the PRS group  
Creditor rights: From Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007). 
Anti-director rights: From Andrei Shleifer’s website. Revised index as described in Djankov et al. (2008). 
Stock market turnover: Ratio of annual trading volume to shares outstanding. Data are from the World Bank.  
Stock market Capit. (%GDP): Ratio of end-of-year stock market capitalization to nominal GDP. Data are from the World 
Bank. 
Private bond market (%GDP): Private domestic debt securities issued by financial institutions and corporations as a 
share of GDP. Data are from the World Bank Financial Development and Structure Database.  
Equity market liberalization: The percentage of the equity market that is investable for foreign investors. Data are from 
EMDB. 
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Appendix C. Sample Selection 
This table shows the procedure for how we construct our final sample from the following main datasets: 
Datastream/WorldScope, CRSP/Compustat, FactSet/LionShares, Morningstar international and IBES. We report the 
total number of stocks for each step.       
 
Procedure Number of stocks 
Common stocks from Datastream/WorldScope and 
CRSP/Compustat for the time period 1999-2009  
45,343 
Merging with mutual fund holding data from FactSet/LionShares 34,839 
Merging with fund information from Morningstar International 23,045 
Merging with I/B/E/S 23,045 
Merging with the main measures of governance from 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) 
21,329 
Other screen procedures: 
Stocks with at least 12 monthly returns, at least 12 months of no 
missing trading volume and with a price greater than U$ 1 
16,313 
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Fig. 1. Governance index by country. This figure shows the horizontal (contracting) and vertical (property rights) 
governance index by country. A larger index value indicates a worse governance practice in our sample.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A reports summary statistics of our sample stocks over the 2000-2009 period. The sample selection procedure is described in Appendix C. 
We also apply several screening procedures for Datastream data errors in monthly returns as suggested by Ince and Porter (2006) and others. Panel 
B reports the correlation matrix of the main variables. Panel C reports the correlation matrix of the governance proxies. All the variables are 
described in Appendix B. 
    
 
Panel A: Distributions 
  Whole Sample Distribution   Quintile Distribution by Horizontal (H) and Vertical (V) Governance Indices 
 
N Mean 
Std 
Dev 
MIN Median MAX 
 
H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 
 
V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 
Asset Pricing Characteristics of Stocks 
            
Amihud Illiqudity 135611 -0.066 0.208 -0.964 -0.006 0.64 
 
-0.031 -0.034 -0.015 -0.11 -0.113 
 
-0.022 -0.036 -0.015 -0.038 -0.131 
Zero Return 135629 0.058 0.105 0 0.016 0.581 
 
0.018 0.049 0.091 0.038 0.118 
 
0.018 0.027 0.107 0.073 0.096 
 
      
 
     
 
     Idiosyn Vol (from 6 factor 
model) 135621 0.022 0.011 0.008 0.020 0.065  0.019 0.019 0.021 0.017 0.02  0.02 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.02 
Idiosyn Vol (from market and 
industry factor model) 135642 0.021 0.011 0.004 0.019 0.066  0.018 0.019 0.020 0.017 0.018  0.020 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.018 
RET 135641 0.011 0.059 -1 0.012 1.278 
 
0.014 0.014 0.018 0.009 0.016 
 
0.01 0.009 0.013 0.016 0.024 
DGTW 135641 0.001 0.042 -0.151 0.001 0.115 
 
0.004 0.007 0.008 -0.004 0.008 
 
0.002 0.002 0.003 0.008 0.013 
M/B 118854 2.31 1.65 0.36 1.8 11.22 
 
2.009 1.809 1.985 2.188 2.207 
 
2.063 1.925 1.745 1.967 2.429 
Tobin`s q 135642 1.39 0.79 0.58 1 7.82 
 
1.539 1.337 1.506 1.532 1.559 
 
1.365 1.403 1.358 1.383 1.79 
Public and Semi-public Information for Stocks 
            
# Analyst Per Stock 167269 8.74 7.97 1.00 6.00 74.00 
 
13 16 16 14 12 
 
21 18 18 10 8 
% Analyst Coverage  50 64% 20% 13% 66% 100% 
 
0.70 0.76 0.67 0.61 0.61 
 
0.77 0.69 0.67 0.70 0.55 
Re 167269 3.63 0.70 1.00 3.67 5.00 
 
3.59 3.49 3.57 3.39 3.44 
 
3.58 3.46 3.47 3.51 3.52 
∆Re  165162 -0.03 0.50 -4.00 0.00 4.00 
 
-0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 
 
-0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 
Standardized  ∆Re 165162 -0.05 0.60 -6.46 -0.03 6.05 
 
-0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 
 
-0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 
# News Per Stock 119499 76.52 219.60 1 37 12322 
 
21.21 19.53 17.63 14.78 14.43 
 
31.88 21.97 18.30 15.18 14.28 
% News Coverage  119499 49.55 3.14 4.00 50.00 100.00 
 
68% 59% 61% 59% 60% 
 
64% 75% 67% 50% 52% 
NS 115727 -0.10 3.52 -56.00 -0.01 66.50 
 
50.3 49.8 49.6 49.0 50.1 
 
49.7 49.9 49.6 49.8 50.4 
∆NS 115723 -0.06 4.30 -58 0 66.5 
 
-0.04 -0.10 -0.09 -0.32 0.46 
 
0.18 -0.01 -0.26 -0.14 0.66 
Standardized  ∆NS 115723 -0.01 0.78 -10.18 0.00 14.28 
 
0.003 0.001 -0.005 -0.009 -0.002 
 
0.009 -0.025 0.008 0.015 -0.032 
Use of Information 
                
            26670717 -2.21 73 -100 -3.13 100  -2.66 -2.74 1.32 -7.70 1.09  -2.68 -2.30 -1.98 -0.83 -1.73 
Fund Horizontal SemPub_Poor   93388 0.033 0.078 0.000 0.008 0.966 
 
0.045 0.028 0.024 0.067 0.045 
 
0.029 0.042 0.025 0.038 0.016 
Fund Vertical SemPub_Poor 92899 0.033 0.077 0.000 0.008 0.962 
 
0.045 0.029 0.036 0.062 0.045 
 
0.030 0.040 0.026 0.058 0.027 
Fund SemPub_Good 104579 0.038 0.085 0.000 0.012 0.979 
 
0.051 0.043 0.045 0.046 0.045 
 
0.036 0.047 0.044 0.049 0.033 
Horizontal SemPub_Poor   128922 0.011 0.022 0 0.005 0.512 
 
0.0068 0.0095 0.0081 0.0118 0.0078 
 
0.0086 0.0085 0.0096 0.0069 0.0096 
Vertical SemPub_Poor 128904 0.011 0.023 0 0.005 0.525 
 
0.0069 0.0098 0.0086 0.0118 0.0085 
 
0.0090 0.0086 0.0100 0.0078 0.0104 
SemPub_Good 134618 0.017 0.023 0 0.011 0.426 
 
0.0105 0.0137 0.0125 0.0236 0.0108 
 
0.0133 0.0133 0.0159 0.0103 0.0132 
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Panel B: Correlation matrix for Semi_Pub measures and stock characteristics 
  
Amihud 
Illiqudity 
Zero 
Return 
Idiosyn 
Vol (from 
market and 
industry 
model) 
Idiosyn 
Vol(from 6 
factor 
model) 
RET DGTW 
Return 
M/B Tobin`s Q Horizontal 
SemPub_Poor 
Vertical 
SemPub_Poor 
SemPub_Good 
Amihud Illiquidity 1 0.071 0.008 0.048 -0.049 -0.032 -0.093 0.001 0.036 0.039 0.025 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.76) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Zero Return   1 0.15 0.093 -0.02 -0.034 -0.084 -0.069 0.012 0.008 0.01 
     (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.31) (0.49) (0.38) 
Idiosyn Vol (from market 
and industry model) 
 
 
1 0.899 0.073 0.05 0.074 0.088 0.026 -0.003 0.046 
 
 
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.82) (0.00) 
Idiosyn Vol (from 6 factor 
model) 
 
  
 
1 0.084 0.06 0.083 0.101 0.026 0.008 0.044 
     
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.51) (0.00) 
RET    
 
 1 0.919 0.174 0.173 -0.013 -0.01 -0.008 
     
 
  
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.29) (0.42) (0.53) 
DGTW Return    
 
   1 0.237 0.233 -0.008 -0.004 0.005 
     
 
  
  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.52) (0.73) (0.71) 
M/B    
 
    1 0.903 -0.011 -0.016 0.084 
     
 
    
  
(0.00) (0.29) (0.12) (0.00) 
Tobin`s Q    
 
      1 -0.014 -0.019 0.088 
     
 
        
 
(0.16) (0.06) (0.00) 
Horizontal SemPub_Poor      
 
         1 0.622 0.176 
     
 
          
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Vertical SemPub_Poor    
 
           1 0.18 
     
 
            
 
(0.00) 
SemPub_Good  
         
1 
 
 
          
 
 
 Panel C: Correlation Matrix of Governance      
 Horizontal Gov Vertical Gov Poor Gov Disclosure Anti_SD Acc Transparency CPI 
Horizontal Gov 1 0.59 0.58 0.2 0.46 0.16 0.6 
 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.25) (0.00) (0.29) (0.00) 
Vertical Gov 
 
1 0.89 0.47 0.02 0.11 0.83 
 
  
(0.00) (0.01) (0.88) (0.46) (0.00) 
Poor Gov 
  
1 0.58 0.11 0.34 0.91 
 
  
 (0.00) (0.52) (0.04) (0.00) 
Disclosure 
  
 1 0.29 0.3 0.64 
 
  
  (0.09) (0.08) (0.00) 
Anti_SD 
  
  1 0.06 0.15 
 
  
   (0.70) (0.29) 
Acc Transparency 
  
   1 0.24 
 
  
    (0.10) 
CPI 
  
    1 
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Table 2: Governance and the Fund-level Use of Semi-public Information (First Stage 
Regression) 
This table conducts the following regression for each fund in a semi-annual holding period,   
                     
            
                                   
where            denotes the percentage rebalancing in split-adjusted holdings of stock i held by 
fund k over the semi-annual period,        is the change in the recommendation of the consensus 
analyst forecast of stock i, and    
is the governance index of the country of the stock.       stacks 
potential control variables, including country and industry return, and lagged analyst recommendation 
changes. The table reports the average value of the regression coefficients and the corresponding 
robust t-statistics. The superscripts 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 refer to the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of statistical 
significance, respectively. The sample includes fund-firm-semiannual observations over the 2000-
2009 period. 
 
 
  
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
       ∆Re 12.587*** 1.725*** 10.383*** 14.124*** 3.865*** 11.628*** 
 
(114.54) (3.96) (67.54) (107.62) (6.83) (57.55) 
∆Re (t-1) 
   
6.078*** 5.675*** 5.633*** 
    
(48.76) (44.01) (43.44) 
Horizontal Gov 
 
-0.048 
  
-2.330*** 
 
  
(-0.08) 
  
(-3.23) 
 ∆Re*Horizontal Gov 
 
30.434*** 
  
27.069*** 
 
  
(26.54) 
  
(18.99) 
 Vertical Gov 
  
-3.513* 
  
-0.486 
   
(-1.77) 
  
(-0.21) 
∆Re*Vertical Gov 
  
25.608*** 
  
26.521*** 
   
(9.37) 
  
(7.53) 
Market Return (t-1) 
   
66.733*** 30.394*** 19.874*** 
    
(4.6) (4.35) (2.78) 
Industry Return (t-1) 
   
61.302*** 53.355*** 51.532*** 
    
(23.37) (19.75) (19.1) 
Constant 10.874*** 11.759*** 10.391*** 8.674*** 10.299*** 9.093*** 
 
(125.57) (50.6) (96.09) (35.34) (29.94) (41.32) 
# Fund-Semiannual 104957 104955 104939 104933 104927 104888 
Avg  R-square 0.038 0.098 0.097 0.142 0.194 0.193 
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Table 3: Fund Performance and the Fund-level Use of Semi-public Information 
This table presents the panel regression analysis of the relationship between Fund SemPub_Poor and fund 
performance. We use the four-factor alpha of Carhart (1997) to measure fund performance based on a 36-month 
rolling window. More specifically, we estimate the factor loadings of funds based on the 36-month period prior 
to t, and then compute the performance of the fund in month t as the difference between the realized fund return 
in month t (in excess of the risk free rate) and the realized risk premium in the same month (i.e., the produc of 
the vector of rolling factor loadings times the realized factor return in month t). We average the monthly 
performance in a semi-annual period as the performance of the period. We then regress out-of-sample 
performance on the use of semi-public and public information induced by poor governance (Fund SemPub_Poor, 
Fund Pub_Poor) and a set of control variables in a panel specification with fixed country and time effects (we 
cluster the residuals by country and time). The fund control variables include the following: expense ratio, 
portfolio turnover, and fund size (defined in terms of total net assets). The superscripts ***, **, and * refer to 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels of statistical significance, respectively. The sample includes fund-semiannual observations 
over the 2000-2009 period.  
 
 
1 2 3 4 
 
Horizontal Fund 
SemPub_Poor 
Vertical Fund 
SemPub_Poor 
Horizontal Fund 
SemPub_Poor 
Vertical Fund 
SemPub_Poor 
Fund SemPub_Poor 0.403*** 0.419*** 0.274** 0.294** 
  (4.12) (3.99) (2.26) (2.32) 
Fund Pub_Poor 
  
0.122 0.176 
   
(1.03) (1.42) 
Fund SemPub_Good -0.384*** -0.416*** -0.164 -0.18 
 
(-3.65) (-3.84) (-1.37) (-1.48) 
ExpenseRatio -0.085*** -0.087*** -0.083*** -0.082*** 
  (-9.82) (-9.9) (-8.58) (-8.28) 
Turnover -0.019 -0.018 0.014 0.016 
 
(-1.18) (-1.12) (0.77) (0.91) 
FundSize -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 
 
(-8.13) (-8.05) (-5.1) (-4.88) 
Constant 0.559*** 0.570*** 0.400*** 0.388*** 
  (8.99) (8.99) (5.82) (5.56) 
Country and Year Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 27078 26381 21631 21209 
R-square 0.049 0.049 0.055 0.055 
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Table 4: Illiquidity and the Use of Semi-public Information 
The table reports the results of the following panel regression: 
                                                                
where            is the illiquidity of stock i, proxied by Amihud Illiquidity and the percentage of zero returns; 
               and                are holding-weighted averages of the use of public information by funds 
that invest in the stock;
 
and the vector of     stacks a list of control variables, including firm-level governance 
(Firm Gov), the volatility of fund flows (Flow_Std), the level of cash over total asset of firms (Cash/TA), capital 
expenditures (CAPEX), return on assets (ROA), institutional ownership (IO), the buy-and-hold return during the 
previous 6 months (MOM), book-to-market (BM), LogSize, and a dummy variable that takes the value of one 
when Firm Gov is available and zero otherwise. These variables are defined in the Appendix B1 and are lagged 
by one period. Regression residuals are clustered by country and year. The superscripts ***, **, and * refer to 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels of statistical significance, respectively. The sample includes firm-semiannual observations 
over the period 2000 to 2009. 
 
 
1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8 
   Amihud Illiquidity   Zero Return 
 
Horizontal Gov Vertical Gov  Horizontal Gov Vertical Gov 
SemPub_Poor 0.336** 0.341** 0.427*** 0.410***  0.089** 0.083** 0.072** 0.064** 
  (2.54) (2.43) (3.82) (3.44)  (2.01) (2.19) (2.21) (2.01) 
SemPub_Good -0.024 -0.025 -0.04 -0.039  -0.062 -0.057 -0.06 -0.055 
 
(-0.42) (-0.47) (-0.86) (-0.93)  (-1.4) (-1.45) (-1.46) (-1.51) 
Firm Gov 
 
-0.063 
 
-0.063    -0.131*   -0.131* 
  
(-1.37) 
 
(-1.36)    (-1.65)   (-1.65) 
Flow_Std 16.988** 17.446** 16.930** 17.387**  0.43 0.311 0.417 0.298 
 
(2.5) (2.58) (2.49) (2.56)  (0.6) (0.46) (0.58) (0.45) 
Cash/TA -1.866 -1.962 -1.86 -1.952  0.45 0.676 0.457 0.683 
 
(-1.5) (-1.53) (-1.48) (-1.51)  (0.82) (1.11) (0.82) (1.11) 
CapEx -5.030*** -4.890*** -5.026*** -4.886***  -0.405 -0.416 -0.405 -0.416 
 
(-3.9) (-3.88) (-3.91) (-3.88)  (-0.74) (-0.74) (-0.74) (-0.74) 
ROA 0.167 0.224 0.168 0.225  0.057 0.037 0.057 0.037 
 
(0.78) (0.97) (0.78) (0.97)  (0.4) (0.28) (0.4) (0.28) 
IO -9.700*** -8.552*** -9.740*** -8.588***  -0.427 -0.415* -0.427 -0.415* 
 
(-4.35) (-3.71) (-4.36) (-3.71)  (-1.54) (-1.69) (-1.53) (-1.68) 
MOM -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.037***  -0.007** -0.006* -0.007** -0.006* 
 
(-5) (-5.3) (-5.01) (-5.31)  (-2.09) (-1.96) (-2.08) (-1.95) 
BM 1.878*** 1.984*** 1.873*** 1.980***  -0.292 -0.244 -0.291 -0.243 
 
(5.81) (4.9) (5.84) (4.92)  (-0.75) (-0.79) (-0.75) (-0.79) 
LogSize 0.01 0.007 0.009 0.007  -0.011* -0.011** -0.011* -0.011** 
 
(1.2) (0.9) (1.18) (0.88)  (-1.93) (-2.13) (-1.94) (-2.14) 
Dummy (Firm Gov) 
 
0.097*** 
 
0.097***    0.056   0.056 
  
(4.57) 
 
(4.56)    (1.57)   (1.57) 
Constant -0.309* -0.224 -0.307* -0.222  0.255** 0.257** 0.255** 0.256** 
 
(-1.77) (-1.3) (-1.75) (-1.29)  (2.01) (2.23) (2.01) (2.23) 
Country and Year 
Fixed-Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 102773 102773 102758 102758  102776 102776 102761 102761 
R-square 0.199 0.214 0.2 0.214  0.575 0.583 0.575 0.583 
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Table 5: Idiosyncratic Volatility and the Use of Semi-public Information 
The table reports the results of the following panel regression: 
                                                                   
where               refers to the log of one plus the Idiosyncratic Volatility of stock i during the period, 
               and                are holding-weighted averages of the use of public information by funds that 
invest in the stock,
 
and the vector of     stacks a list of control variables. These variables are defined in the 
Appendix B and are lagged by one period. Regression residuals are clustered by country and year. The superscripts 
***, **, and * refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of statistical significance, respectively. The sample includes firm-
semiannual observations over the 2000-2009 period. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
Idiosyncratic Volatility From  
Domestic and Global Fama-French  factors 
Idiosyncratic Volatility from 
 Industry and Market Factors 
 
Horizontal Gov Vertical Gov Horizontal Gov Vertical Gov 
SemPub_Poor 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 
 
(4.94) (4.99) (3.91) (3.84) (4.16) (4.28) (3.52) (3.48) 
SemPub_Good 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 
(5.21) (5.33) (5.54) (5.65) (4.45) (4.49) (4.72) (4.79) 
Firm Gov   0.009***   0.009***   0.010***   0.010*** 
 
  (4.42)   (4.42)   (5.53)   (5.53) 
Flow_ Std 1.941*** 1.833*** 1.932*** 1.824*** 1.775*** 1.682*** 1.762*** 1.669*** 
 
(4.38) (3.66) (4.4) (3.67) (4.63) (4.33) (4.65) (4.37) 
ICRG Political -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.017*** 
  (-5.09) (-4.99) (-5.07) (-4.98) (-4.73) (-4.94) (-4.69) (-4.9) 
Creditor rights -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(-1.54) (-1.35) (-1.54) (-1.35) (-0.89) (-0.76) (-0.9) (-0.77) 
Anti-director rights 0.031 0.041 0.03 0.041 0.078 0.088 0.077 0.088 
 
(0.39) (0.52) (0.39) (0.52) (1.11) (1.26) (1.1) (1.25) 
Stock market turnover 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(1.04) (1.06) (1.04) (1.07) (0.66) (0.66) (0.67) (0.66) 
Stock market Capit. (%GDP) 0.145*** 0.112 0.144*** 0.111 0.132*** 0.101 0.131*** 0.1 
 
(6.07) (1.32) (5.9) (1.3) (3.7) (1.21) (3.71) (1.19) 
Private bond market (%GDP) -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
 
(-1.95) (-1.73) (-1.95) (-1.73) (-2.34) (-2.14) (-2.35) (-2.15) 
Equity market liberalization -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 
 
(-0.52) (-0.65) (-0.47) (-0.6) (-1.15) (-1.26) (-1.1) (-1.21) 
Disclosure 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
 
(0.5) (0.62) (0.49) (0.61) (1.98) (2.09) (1.96) (2.08) 
PPE/TA -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
(-2.52) (-2.35) (-2.51) (-2.33) (-4.18) (-4.04) (-4.19) (-4.06) 
ROA -0.072 -0.071 -0.072 -0.071 -0.083 -0.082 -0.084 -0.082 
 
(-1.44) (-1.42) (-1.44) (-1.42) (-1.42) (-1.4) (-1.42) (-1.4) 
Cash/TA 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 
(2.95) (2.93) (2.95) (2.93) (2.63) (2.62) (2.63) (2.62) 
Debt maturity 0.022 0.025 0.022 0.025 -0.011 -0.007 -0.01 -0.007 
 
(0.52) (0.59) (0.52) (0.59) (-0.31) (-0.22) (-0.3) (-0.21) 
R&D 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
. (5.08) (5.17) (5.1) (5.19) (6.75) (6.81) (6.78) (6.84) 
Zero Return 0.037 0.147 0.038 0.148 0.118 0.24 0.119 0.241 
 
(0.08) (0.33) (0.08) (0.34) (0.27) (0.58) (0.28) (0.58) 
Age(log) -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(-3.05) (-3.15) (-3.07) (-3.17) (-2.59) (-2.71) (-2.61) (-2.73) 
Leverage 0.075*** 0.074*** 0.075*** 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.071** 0.072*** 0.071** 
 
(2.71) (2.67) (2.72) (2.67) (2.59) (2.56) (2.59) (2.56) 
IO -0.048 -0.02 -0.048 -0.019 -0.127*** -0.098** -0.126*** -0.098** 
 
(-1.08) (-0.89) (-1.07) (-0.86) (-4.95) (-2.24) (-4.96) (-2.23) 
BM 2.677 2.609 2.673 2.606 2.955 2.86 2.95 2.855 
 
(0.64) (0.62) (0.64) (0.62) (0.74) (0.71) (0.74) (0.71) 
LogSize -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 
(-5.58) (-6.32) (-5.57) (-6.3) (-6.57) (-7.59) (-6.59) (-7.61) 
Dummy (Firm Gov)   -0.005***   -0.005***   -0.005***   -0.005*** 
 
  (-3.79)   (-3.8)   (-4.42)   (-4.43) 
Constant 0.078*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.077*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 
 
(6.66) (6.82) (6.65) (6.82) (7.3) (7.51) (7.28) (7.49) 
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes     
Observations 81793 81793 81779 81779 81793 81793 81779 81779 
R-square 0.436 0.44 0.436 0.44 0.434 0.438 0.434 0.438 
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Table 6: Firm Value and the Use of Semi-public Information 
Panel A reports the results of the following panel regression: 
                                                                                         
                                    
where          refers to the raw return of stock i in columns 1-4 and its DGTW return in columns 5-8,       and      are dummies 
referring to positive and negative changes in standardized analyst recommendations,                and                are 
holding-weighted averages of the use of public information by funds that invest in the stock, and the vector of     stacks control 
variables defined in Appendix B. In Panel B, the dependent variables are log market-to-book ratios and log Tobin’s Q. The 
residuals are clustered by country and year. The superscripts ***, **, and * refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of statistical significance, 
respectively. We include firm-semiannual observations over the 2000-2009 period. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Panel A. Stock Performance  and  SemPub_Poor with Information Dummy 
 
Raw Return  DGTW return 
 
Horizontal Gov Vertical Gov Horizontal Gov Vertical Gov 
SemPub_Poor* Dgood 0.150*** 0.149*** 0.087*** 0.085*** 0.131*** 0.13*** 0.094*** 0.093*** 
 
(5.08) (5.12) (3.31) (3.16) (5.26) (5.38) (4.92) (5.07) 
SemPub_Poor*Dbad -0.11*** -0.109*** -0.141*** -0.142*** -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.115*** -0.115*** 
 
(-2.77) (-2.77) (-2.71) (-2.69) (-4.09) (-4.11) (-4.26) (-4.24) 
SemPub_Good*Dgood 0.023  0.022  0.0341 0.033 0.053*** 0.0529*** 0.0604*** 0.06*** 
 
(0.79) (0.76) (1.28) (1.23) (2.94) (2.94) (3.48) (3.49) 
SemPub_Good *Dbad -0.068*** -0.0679*** -0.0658*** -0.066*** -0.031*** -0.0315*** -0.0312*** -0.031*** 
 
(-3.15) (-3.18) (-3.21) (-3.25) (-2.92) (-2.96) (-2.71) (-2.75) 
Firm Gov 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.002  -0.0025 
 
-0.003 
  
(-0.39) 
 
(-0.39)  (-0.45) 
 
(-0.44) 
Flow_Std  -2.3517 -2.2778 -2.3497 -2.275 -0.916 -0.8785 -0.8948 -0.857 
 
(-0.7) (-0.68) (-0.7) (-0.68) (-0.8) (-0.75) (-0.78) (-0.74) 
MOM -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(-0.32) (-0.25) (-0.33) (-0.26) (-0.66) (-0.6) (-0.66) (-0.61) 
leverage -0.758 -0.753 -0.758 -0.753 -0.219** -0.216** -0.219** -0.216** 
 
(-1.08) (-1.07) (-1.08) (-1.07) (-2.25) (-2.24) (-2.25) (-2.24) 
IO -0.419 -0.363 -0.409 -0.351 -0.326*** -0.293*** -0.326*** -0.287*** 
 
(-1.06) (-0.94) (-1.02) (-0.91) (-5.72) (-4.66) (-5.72) (-4.64) 
BM 0.024 0.038 0.030 0.043  -0.286*** -0.277*** -0.286*** -0.273*** 
 
(0.56) (0.81) (0.68) (0.92) (-7.37) (-8.53) (-7.37) (-8.43) 
LogSize -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001** 
 
(-2.71) (-2.73) (-2.65) (-2.67) (-2.69) (-2.52) (-2.69) (-2.44) 
Dummy (Firm Gov)   0.0044   0.004  0.003 
 
0.003 
 
  (1.15)   (1.15)  (0.87) 
 
(0.87) 
Constant 0.117*** 0.121*** 0.117*** 0.120*** 0.023*** 0.025** 0.0228*** 0.0249** 
 
(5.7) (5.43) (5.65) (5.4) (2.69) (2.43) (2.63) (2.39) 
Country and Year  
 Fixed-Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 96103 96091 96103 96091 96103   96103 96091   96091 
R-square 0. 224 0.224 0.224 0.224 0.018 0.02 0.017 0.02 
Panel B:   Firm value  and  SemPub_Poor  
 
Market to Book Tobin’s Q 
 
Horizontal Gov Vertical Gov Horizontal Gov Vertical Gov 
SemPub_Poor -0.363*** -0.255** -0.399*** -0.267** -0.237*** -0.160* -0.258*** -0.164* 
 
(-3.16) (-2.23) (-3.59) (-2.41) (-2.72) (-1.83) (-3.06) (-1.95) 
SemPub_Good 0.152*** 0.152*** 0.158*** 0.157*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.106*** 0.105*** 
 
(3.01) (3.02) (3.11) (3.10) (2.62) (2.63) (2.75) (2.73) 
Firm Gov 
 
0.122*** 
 
0.122***  0.098*** 
 
0.098*** 
  
(5.97) 
 
(5.96)  (6.34) 
 
(6.33) 
Flow_ Std -65.157*** -56.721*** -65.293*** -56.818*** -43.376*** -37.436*** -43.458*** -37.490*** 
 
(-7.02) (-6.13) (-7.03) (-6.14) (-6.16) (-5.33) (-6.17) (-5.33) 
LogSize 0.170*** 0.172*** 0.170*** 0.172*** 0.131*** 0.133*** 0.131*** 0.133*** 
 
(68.29) (69.25) (68.29) (69.24) (69.44) (70.29) (69.45) (70.28) 
R&D 0.164*** 0.174*** 0.163*** 0.174*** 0.416*** 0.423*** 0.416*** 0.423*** 
 
(3.88) (4.13) (3.87) (4.13) (12.99) (13.24) (12.99) (13.24) 
ROE 0.038** 0.037** 0.038** 0.037** 0.085*** 0.084*** 0.085*** 0.084*** 
 
(2.31) (2.24) (2.30) (2.24) (6.69) (6.64) (6.69) (6.64) 
FROE 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 
(3.32) (3.28) (3.34) (3.30) (1.19) (1.15) (1.20) (1.16) 
F2ROE -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(-2.26) (-2.32) (-2.28) (-2.33) (-0.72) (-0.77) (-0.74) (-0.78) 
Dummy (Firm Gov) 
 
-0.151*** 
 
-0.151***  -0.110*** 
 
-0.110*** 
  
(-15.40) 
 
(-15.36)  (-14.81) 
 
(-14.78) 
Constant -3.323*** -3.337*** -3.323*** -3.338*** -2.541*** -2.550*** -2.541*** -2.550*** 
 
(-64.34) (-64.83) (-64.35) (-64.83) (-64.85) (-65.25) (-64.86) (-65.26) 
Firm  and Year  
 Fixed-Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 90,545 90,545 90,533 90,533 90,545 90,545 90,533 90,533 
R-square 0.814 0.815 0.814 0.815 0.832 0.833 0.832 0.833 
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Table 7: Crisis Period Liquidity Crunches   
The table reports the results of the following cross-sectional regression with country fixed effects: 
                                                   
where        is the illiquidity (proxied by Amihud Illiquidity and Zero Return) of stock i during the crisis period 
(2008-2009) minus that of the pre-crisis period (2005-2007),              and              are holding-
weighted averages of the use of semi-public information by funds in the pre-crisis period for the stock, and the vector 
of   stacks a list of control variables as defined in Appendix B. All control variables are computed as the mean of 
their pre-crisis period values. The superscripts ***, **, and * refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of statistical significance, 
respectively.      
 
 
 
1 2  3 4 
 
∆Amihud Illiquidity  ∆Zero Return 
 
Horizontal Gov Vertical Gov  Horizontal Gov Vertical Gov 
SemPub_Poor 1.008*** 0.921***  0.112*** 0.128*** 
  (3.62) (3.45)  (2.96) (3.57) 
SemPub_Good -0.619*** -0.613***  0.006 0.003 
 
(-5.06) (-5)  (0.37) (0.16) 
Flow_Std  -6.074 -6.188  1.474 1.492 
  (-0.63) (-0.64)  (1.18) (1.19) 
Cash/TA -3.781*** -3.794***  0.189* 0.185* 
 
(-4.76) (-4.78)  (1.83) (1.79) 
CapEx 0.047 0.043  0.012 0.011 
 
(0.12) (0.11)  (0.23) (0.23) 
ROA 0.219 0.221  -0.075 -0.074 
 
(0.54) (0.55)  (-1.43) (-1.43) 
IO 6.358*** 6.345***  -0.356*** -0.366*** 
 
(9.13) (9.09)  (-3.7) (-3.81) 
MOM -0.033
*** -0.033***  -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 
(-6.98) (-6.98)  (-7.44) (-7.44) 
BM -6.836*** -6.787***  0.075 0.079 
 
(-3.62) (-3.6)  (0.31) (0.32) 
LogSize -0.048*** -0.049***  -0.002*** -0.002*** 
  (-38.5) (-38.38)  (-10.38) (-10.53) 
Constant 1.070*** 1.071***  0.036*** 0.036*** 
 
(40.37) (40.27)  (8.65) (8.76) 
Country Fixed-Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 8265 8265  8265 8265 
 R-square  0.264 0.264  0.149 0.15 
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Table 8: Crisis Period Return and Pre-Crisis SemPub_Poor 
The table reports the results of the following cross-sectional regression: 
                                              
where      is the change in value of stock i, proxied by the DGTW return of stock i during the 2008-2009 crisis 
period in columns 1 and 2 and the increment of market-to-book ratios from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period 
in in columns 3 and 4.               and              are holding-weighted average of the use of semi-public 
information by funds in the pre-crisis period for the stock,  the vector of    stacks a list of control variables as 
defined in Appendix B. All control variables are computed as the mean of their pre-crisis period values. The 
superscripts ***, **, and * refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of statistical significance, respectively. 
 
 
1 2  3 4 
 DGTW Return  ∆Market to Book 
 
Horizontal Gov Vertical Gov  Horizontal Gov Vertical Gov 
SemPub_Poor -0.217*** -0.17***  -2.835*** -2.231*** 
  (-4.16) (-3.41)  (-4) (-3.33) 
SemPub_Good 0.032 0.026  -0.011 -0.092 
 
(1.42) (1.15)  (-0.04) (-0.3) 
Flow_Std -2.326 -2.239  -15.323 -13.979 
 
(-0.96) (-0.92)  (-0.43) (-0.4) 
Leverage -0.883*** -0.883***  
  
 
(-4.25) (-4.25)  
  IO -0.773*** -0.777***  
  
 
(-6.44) (-6.46)  
  MOM 0.017*** 0.017***  
  
 
(20.38) (20.38)  
  BM 0.128 0.126  
  
 
(0.4) (0.39)  
  LogSize 0.001** 0.001**  0.033*** 0.032*** 
 
(2.21) (2.14)  (11.75) (11.61) 
R&D 
  
 0.723*** 0.722*** 
   
 (8.75) (8.74) 
ROE 
  
 -0.640*** -0.636*** 
   
 (-7.47) (-7.43) 
Constant -0.03*** -0.03***  -1.093*** -1.089*** 
 
(-5.86) (-5.75)  (-19.28) (-19.18) 
Country Fixed-Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 7826 7826  7756 7756 
R-square 0.06 0.06  0.033 0.033 
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Table 9: Endogeneity Test 
The table reports the results of the following two panel regressions:   
 
                                                                                
                        
    
                                                                                              
  
where         is the percentage change in the aggregate mutual fund holdings of stock   with the level of 
                   in country   (in which the stock is traded) over the period of t,                    is the 
change in the value of SemPub_Poor of the stock over period t conditioned on the fund ownership information 
observed at t-1, and         is the annual change in the Corruption Perceptions Index of country c, in which stock i 
is traded. The Corruption Perceptions Index ranges from 0 (very clean) to 10 (highly corrupt).        stacks a list of 
control variables. The superscripts 
***
, 
**
, and 
* 
refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of statistical significance, 
respectively. The sample includes firm-year observations over the 2000-2009 period. 
 
 
1 2 
 
3 4 
 
Dependent variable =         
 
Dependent variable =                   
Parameter Horizontal Gov Vertical Gov 
 
Horizontal Gov Vertical Gov 
∆CPI 0.01 -0.004 
 
0.11** 0.15*** 
  (0.79) (-0.34) 
 
(2.44) (3.12) 
SemPub_Pooric,t-1 -0.526
*** -0.455*** 
   
 
(-4) (-3.73) 
   ∆CPI* SemPub_Poori,c,t-1 -1.066
** 0.538 
   
 
(2.15) (1.15) 
   IO -5.495
*** -5.453*** 
 
4.698 0.497 
  (-5.5) (-5.45) 
 
-1.17 -0.12 
MOM 0.108
*** 0.108*** 
 
0.027 0.024 
  (17.04) (17.03) 
 
-0.94 -0.8 
BM 1.976* 1.967* 
 
0.068 3.341 
  (1.73) (1.72) 
 
-0.02 -0.78 
Logsize 0.008*** 0.009*** 
 
0.012 0.004 
  (4.47) (4.53) 
 
-1.59 -0.53 
Constant -0.039 -0.042 
 
-0.358* -0.208 
  (-0.79) (-0.84) 
 
(-1.81) (-0.99) 
Observations 56142 56142 
 
51066 51066 
R-square 0.047 0.047 
 
0.006 0.005 
 
 
 
